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CHAPTER I 
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE EUDAEMONOLOGICAL 
ARGUMEN'.r 
.. 
The oudaemonological argument tor the existence ot 
God ia baaed on the existence tn the rational appetite ot a 
natural deaire tor God. We pl'opose, therefore. to review 
brietlr the history 01' theorie. of natural de8ire tor God, 
then to anal,... the f1lJgum.ent Itselt:l and tinally to test the 
validity of the argument. 
In a oreationiat philoaophy ot the world, one tact 
1s unanmously acoepted by all parties to the queltion. All 
agree that every oreature implicitly and neoeasarily doe8 seek 
God in every action. Considering man more particularly, how-
ever, and asking tu.rtb.er whether man naturally seeks God and 
how God figures aa a natural object ot manta rational appetite, 
we find evidenoe of roughly tlu.-ee positions. We sball outline 
these position. briefly at once and then examine them indivId-
ually in more detal1. In this historioal a.na.l.781a we shall 
tollow in general the monograph of Patriok It. Bastable on the 
subJeot. 1 
--
1 Patrick K. Butable, .De_s;;,;;;:i ... re ;.... f~ God, London, 1947. 
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How, then, doe. God .figuN "a the objeot ot the 
rational appetite? For tba moat part, the Domin1can 'fhomists 
.ould e.nswer that the higheat u.. or man's natural powers :1s 
1;be ns.~a! contemplation ot God. In tbis sena., man does .eek 
God direotly. A modem .ehoel o.f 'lhom1sts, in which Rousaelot 
and Mar_ahal bave been promiMnt, wou14 agJ.'ee that God 1s the 
supreme object ot the natural powers of man, but they go on 
to say that theae same powers naturall,. de.ire an even more 
direot knowledge ot H1m.. Man desire. to know God d1:rectl,.-· 
although he has no natural pow.x- to do so. The th1l:'d achool 
of thought. tn! tla:teci b7 Dllrul Scotus, aaTs tbat the natural 
desireaf man 1a, strictly speaking, not tor 1nd~eot knowledge 
of God, but tor d11"e.1; vi8ion ot Htm. Man naturally de.ires 
and, gl"anted pertect ule ot his faculties, baa the natural 
power to ... God directly_ 
w. bave thea. tbr •• po.ttls. in general there:t'o1"8. 
The first hold. tbat man. naturall,. d.8U-•• to know (Jod 
ineill.ftll- '!be aecond holda tbat man naturally desires to 
know Gqdd1r,o!1l but does not have tbe natural power to do so. 
And the thUd holds that man natUl'aU,. de.itte. to know God 
direot17 and bas the power to do .0. The first and second 
positions both cla1m to be the eorreot and orig1nal. teaohins 
of st. '.tbomas on the matter, or at least the oorrect interpre-
tation of his teaching. 
3 
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The question of natuPal 4&s1re tor God is one that 
arises in the 8ul1st soholastie phUoaophers. The further 
d ••• lopment, that beeauss it is a natural deaire it otters 
another method. of demonstrating the existence ot God, 1s of 
].ater origin. St .. Thoma. himself never reterx-ed to natural 
desire asa posslble proof for the existence of God. U we 
oan grant, however. an Wtlal na'tuJ1tal desire tor God 1n tho 
rationa.l appetite, and lt it ls a. na:tural d.a1re 1n the strict 
sense ot the teN, then the proof 1. a necessary corollary ot 
tbe des11'e. For, gl"anted the existence of such a desire, •• 
IlUst admit the existenoe ot its term. Absolu.tely speaking, 
such a natUl"al desire cannot be frustrated. 
Our inv •• tigation. therefore" Gone.rna itself with 
two questions, The tlrat. doea the rational. appetite naturall,. 
4 •• 11'. God? 'l'he .scond, 1t such is the oa •• , can this natut'al 
4 •• ire be ••• d to demonstrate the existence ot God? 
About tM t11'8' queatlon, namely, that in the 
rational appetite there 18 a tJPe ot natural desire f~ God, 
there is no dlffioult,. This beoomes clear- 1f we consider the 
neoe$sElrY relationShip bfttween creature Slld Oreator. In 
oreation, God diftu ••• His own goodness. And as exemplary 
cause, God necessarlly reproduces in the creature some imita-
tion ot His own goodness. Every created thing w111 be in some 
4 
.. 
• a1 an imitation of His own goOdness. In seeking, therefore, 
any created good, man inevitably seeks Goodness itself. 
Gilson says: 
It we say that each good 1s but a particular good 
we can only mean, not that these particular goods 
are detached puts ot a whole which would be 
Goodness, but that the.,. are analogues ot the crea-
tive Good that save them birth. In this sense, 
then, it 1s true that to love any good "batao.".r 
1s always to love 1ts resemblance to the divine 
goodness, and, sinee 1t is this resemblanoe to God 
that makes this good to be a good, we oan say that 
what 1s loved 1n it 1s the Sovereign Good. In 
other words, 1t is impossible to lon the 1m.age with .. 
out at the same time lOVing the wlg1nal .. and it .e 
know, as WfJ do know, that tbe 1mage a onl7 an image, 
1t 18 impossible to love 1t without p~.:r.l'T1ng the 
~1g1nal. What holds or the whole totality at crea-
tures holds much more ot tnan in particular. 'fa w111 
any objeot 18 to wlU an 1ma.ae ot God, that 1s, to 
w111 God; to love oneselt, tben, '11111 be ti love an 
analogue of God, and that ls to 10 ... e God. . 
In a creationiat phl1oaophl of thing.. con •• quent1:r, there 1. 
no difficulty about the :relation of eve'!!'1 being to (lod aa to 
a tinal cau.e. This d •• ire tor God is implicit 1n the activity 
or every creature. 
Wllen we ask the second question, whether this desiI'e 
tor God be the basi. tor an independent d.emonatration of His 
existence # the way become. considerably more complica.ted • 
.. . ,
". ~~----------------------------------------------------, 
TbB eudaemonological argument would seek to prove the existence 
of God from the DAtural tendency of the rational appetite to-
.ard Him. Our immediate task~ before considering at length the 
argument itself, 18 to sketch briefly the history of natural 
desire. 
It is questIonable whether W$ can apeak of a natural. 
desire for God, in the proper sense of the term, in the writings 
ot pagan philosophers. There 1s no doubt. hoWever. that they 
did give indication of tb.e sublime goals atta1nable by man. 
perhaps Plato expreas •• this best= 
lie who has been instructed thUs tar in tM things 
of love, and who has learned to see the beautiful in 
due order and ncc •• sion, when he oomes toward the 
end will suddenly perceIve a nature o£ wondrOu.s beauty (and this, Socrates, 1. the tinal caua8 of all our 
tormal toils) • • • • And the true order of gOing, or 
being led by another, to the things of love, 1s to 
begin trom the b4Jautie. ot earth and mount upward. 
tor tbe sake ot that other beauty, uaUlg these as steps 
only~ and trom one go1ng on to two" and from two to 
all fail' forma, and fl"01n fair forms to tail" practices, 
and from tail" practioe. to tail' notiona, until from 
tair notion. be urlves lLt the notion ot tl:le abaolute 
beauty, and at last know. wbat the essence of beauty 
1s. This, my dear Socrates. • • 1s that lUe above 
all others whioh man .hould live, in the oontempla-
tion of absolute be~t1; a beauty Which it you once 
beheld, you would see to be not after the mea.upe of 
gold, and garment., and tail' boys and youtha, whose 
prfulence now entrances you, and you and. many a one 
would be content to 11ve aeeing them only and. con-
verslng with them without meat 01' drink, it that .ere 
p08s1bl.e.-you only "ant to look at them. and to be with 
them. But .bat it man had .,..s to Me the true beauty--
the divine beauty, I mean, pUl"e and olear and unalloyed, 
6 
• 
not clogged with the pollutions of mortality and all 
the colors and vanities of human life--thither look~ 
ing, and. holding converse with tho true beauty simple 
and divine? Remember how in that communion 0111y, be-
holding beauty with the eye of the mind, he w111 be 
enabled to bring forth. not images 01.' beauty. but 
realities (tor be bas hold not at a.n image but of a 
reality), and bringing forth and nourishing true 
virtue to bee om. the 1.'1' lend of God and be 1mm.ortal, 
if mortal man may. Would that be an ignoble lite? 2 
Thus Plato outlines the relationship of participated goodness 
to the essence of goodness and reveals the natural tendency of 
the soul to seek goodness in its purest torm. 
Aristotle teaches that a natural desire 1s found in 
• .,ery natuzaal torm. In the intellect we tind the natural de-
sire to know. Sinee the intelleot 1. man'. most perfeot power, 
reasons Aristotle, the end ot man will be the activity ot that 
power speculating on the highest attainable truths. The natura.l 
desire 01.' the will is tor happiness. Men dirre~ as to the na-
ture 01: what makes man truly happy, but for Aristotle it was 
the perfect use ot the intelleot, manta highest faculty. 
Aristotle speaks, therefore, ot natural des~e, but he haa, 
strictly speaking, no natural desire tor ~. 
In the writings 01: Augustine there i8 no lack of 
tbeory coneerning natural desire for God. But at the same time 
2 Plato, Sl!2osium. tral. B. Jowett, ~D1alogues 
2!. _pl;;;;;.;;a ..... t ..... o, New York, 1899. 211 t. 
there ia no Indication ot a ptlN17 'Phl108ophloal rieW'P0lnt. 
ThUS the vibrant expres.ion of the only hi.tor1e.l .~ man 
• .,81' had: "Thou hast tOl'l1ed \UI tor thyselt, and our hearts 
are restless until they reat 1n the.," 18 ot ltttle utility 
1n the ~re8ent dlacu8aion. 
We begin our stud,. of natural dealre, ps-operl,.. 
epeak1nF., with at. Thomaa. An6 the tIrltt tact to be raced 1. 
that Thomas apparentl,. contHd!.otad himself 1n .".aklnp! ot 
natural desire. Tb1s apparent contradictlon 1s ohvlou8 It we 
consider two passares of Thomas torether. (Author'. itallce.) 
55.nee then it !.8 impossible f'~ a natural d •• l" 
to be vold,-and it would be were it impos8ible to 
err!.vt!¥ at underatandlnr, the d1vine substance, ,t~l !l! 
,tnt! desire th18 qatur.}.&f ..... muet oonolude tbat 
',s p08sf61e for tlie (! " ne eubstanee to be se.n by 
mean. of the lntellect. • • .3 
Wherefore .en anyone •• If-counseled and aided 'by 
divine graoe chooses a ce~taln ~od, whleh aotually 
constitute. bi. prope~ ha~p1nese, to aohieve hie 
hap"lnes., then he ",ins 1'l'l8rl t , not becauss the 
bapp1nee8 he aoh1eved wae natural, but rathe, becaus! 
the particular th,lf!8 M achieved wai"iiot lea rea iii'turatt;r',' '''u'O'li 'as' to:;-"rilon 'Of 'ttOa',t · .. ·in ili"t"oli -
actually h1iibiatrtu&. !oe$ eonslat' •• 
11'. , ...... 
s 0.0 •• III, 51, Summa Contra r~nt~e. of St. 
Thomas Agulnaa, Enp:l1ab Dom1iiIoan 'Fa£&r;;: ... tOon .. -r9B, III, lB. I. - fI '" 
8. 
While the tirst text seems to indicate a natural desire for 
God, it is apparently contradioted by the second. We can state 
at once that it is not the object of this paper to enter this 
problem in textual interpretation. MoreOVer, because Thomas 
does not himself mention the eudaemonological argument, we do 
not have to discuss directly his doctrine on natural desire. 
Wha.t we are interested in is the studies of this app&l'lont con-
tradiction made by subsequent Thomists. F'or it is in these 
stUdies that the evolution of the oudaemono1ogical arguraent 
is apparent. 
We can enter now a. rapid survey of ll'homistlc teach ... 
ing on natUl'al de sire. rthe souree for much of the following 
matter is the dissertation of Patriek K. Bastablo, Desire for 
.. ............. 
~, whioh otters a detailed study ot the history ot natural 
desire among Thomists. 
or the great oommentators. Cajetan oonoerns himself ! I 
only with the question of natural desire tor the beatific 
vision. The desire to see God directly, according to him, is 
elicited and consequent on the perception of supernatural 
ettects. 5 The tact that this interpretation is based on 
supernatural effects and supposes therefore the existence of 
Patrick K. Bastable, Desire For God, London, 
, ............................ 
.1, 
, 
9 
God removes its significance from the matter proper to this 
paper. 
Sylvester ot: Ferrara., however, holds that m.an's nat-
ural desire for the vision of the divine essence is a desire 
for God not as object of beatitude but as first cause. Since, 
in his theory, we ca.nnot know by na.tural rea.son that the 
beatific vision is the supreme good of intellectua.l nature--
we know only that God is the first cause--lt follows that our 
natura.l desire 1s for vision of ~1S divine essence g~ first 
caUSB, and gua object of supernatural beatitude. 6 Thus 
sylvester holds a nat'llr'al desire for God based on knowledge 
of effects. This introduces one type of natural desire for 
God which all schools of thought would admit, but Which many 
would say does not go far enough. It is based on the principle 
that the intellect desires to !mow things perfectly. To know 
crea.tures perfeotly it must know their cause, and therefore, 
desires to know God as first cause. This is a natu.ral desire 
of the intellect which, it must be noted, presupposes tiw 
existence of God. We shall treat this desire at greater length 
in subsequent chapters. 
John of st. Thomas follows essentially the doctrine 
of Cajetan. The existence of the supernatural order is lmown, 
6 Ibid., ,38. 
-
... 
10 
and from its effects man desires to In~ow God. Bastable says: 
"The central point of John of st. Thomas' teaching is ~1at, 
for st. Thomas natural des1re means a desire confonnable to 
manls nature, since it is merely an application of the general 
desire to know causes, and arises spontaneously on the percep-
tion of supernatural effeots." 7 Here, again, 1s evidenoe of 
the natural desire of tl~ intellect to know things perfectly. 
John of st. Tllomas also uses this natural desire of tl1.e intel-
lect to prove the nonrepU?;nanoe of the vision of the essence 
of God. His reasoning is simple. Man's desire to see God is 
the result of the natural activity of his mental life. Man 
naturally desires to know things perfectly, 1.e. according to 
their oauses, and therefore desires to know God who is first 
cause. Because this desire to know God 1s in conformity with 
mants natural mental l11:e. he oonoludes that the desire is not 
repugnant, although it is beyond the range of his natural powerS 
Here again lfEl are dealing with an elicited OOSiIlEl and supposing 
the existence of God. This argu-7l1ent, to prove the nonrepugnance 
of the beatific vision, differs, therefore, completely from the 
eudaemonologieal argument. For the latter 1s based on innate 
desire and proves rather than presupposes the existenoe of God. 
7 
8 
Ibid., 40. 
--
Ibid., 48. 
-
11 
It is evident, therefore, that mants natural aspiration to the 
beatific vision on the intellectual plane differs from the nat-
ural aspiration ot man for God on Which the eudaemonological 
argument is based. The very existenoe of God is deduced from 
the latter aspiration, while the former supposes it. 
Duns Scotus, who was born approximately at the time 
of st. Thomas' death, was the first philosopher to propound 
and eXplain thoroughly th.e th.eory that man bas an innate desire 
for God. This theory was the logical result of his univocal 
concept of being. Because of his perfect precision, the con-
cept of being was predicated of God and man in exactly tho 
same comprehension. Scotus taught that the object of th.e human 
intellect was being in its widest extension. The divine 
essenoe, therefore, became part of the primary object of the 
intelleot, and man had an innate desire for the beatific 
vision. 9 
Dominicus Soto also taught that man has a natural 
desire tor the beatific vision. This, apparently, wa.s an in-
nate desire of the w111. Because the bea.tific vision 1s the 
only concrete objeot which can satisfy the rational appetite, 
man tends naturally to that vision. He teaches that on the 
9 Ibid., 53. 
-
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le~el of elicited desire the will is dependent on knowledge 
and cannot therefore elicit a desire tor the beatific vision 
of its own unaided power. Bastable explains the logic of his 
position in this way: tiMan has a natural desire for the 
beatific vision, even though he cannot, by his own w1aided 
power, satisfy that desire. For, the goal of a natural incli-
nation must be a definite concrete obj~ct,' and we cannot point 
to any object outside of the beat1tic vision which would com ... 
pletely satisfy human appetite." 10 Both Soto's apPl"oach to 
the problem of natural desire and his supposition are charao-
teristic of those who favor the eudaemonological argument. 
'rhe supposition 1s that the finalism of man's faculties is 
explicable only in a term which satisfies them absolutely. 
To speak of an absolutely satisfying term centers attention on 
the only absolutely satisfying object we know of, rather than 
on the nature of the rational appetite. We shall consider 
these aspects of the problem later. Francis Toletu8, pupil of 
Soto, followed his teacher in holding that man has an innate 
desire for the beatific vision, although, in the present life 
its possibility could not be demonstrated. 11 
.. 
In the seventeenth century, Joannes Martinez de 
10 ill,£ •• 57· 
11 Ibid., 58. 
-
13 
.. 
Ripalda reduoed the dootrine of innate desire for God to its 
logioal oonolusion by shmving that it implied a transoendental 
relation between human nature and the beatific vision. This 
introduction of a transcendental relation into the discussion 
foreshadowed a modern sohool of thought professedly toaching 
the existence of a transcendental relation between hunlan nature 
and the vision of God. We shall review this position later. 
Ripalda himself followed the traditional Dominican teaching 
on natural desire. 
A century before Ripalda, Dominic Bannez had fo~~­
ulated what has become the standard Dominican position on nat-
ural desire tor God. Man, he said, does not have an innate 
desire to see God. On perception ot effects, man forms an 
elicited desire to see their first cause. This desire to see 
God is elioited, conditional, and inefficacious. The beatific 
vision is not within the unaided powers of man. 12 
Gabriel Vasquez was the first to introduce the idea 
of the adequate object of the intellect. Like John of st. 
Th~nas, Vasquez believed that the beatifio vision is possible 
beoause the elicited desire for it is the product of the nat-
ural working of the intellect. He adds, however, as another 
reason for the possibility of the beatific vision, the fact 
12 Ibid., dt.. 
-
that God is oontained within the adequate objeot of the intel-
lect. 13 Exoept £or his theory of ~~ aotive obediental capac-
ity .. Francis Suarez tollows Ban.l'16Z and the standard DO'minican 
tradition. An innate desire is sirnply a metaphorical expres-
sion describing the relation of a potency to its act. For 
suarez, therefore, man having only an obediental capacity for 
the vision of God, has no innate desire for that vision. An 
elicited desire is a real action depending on knowledge .. and 
this is the desire that man has for the bea.ti.fic vision. It 
is an elicited, inefficacious, and oonditional desire, a. nd 
would not cause a sense o£ frustration in a state of purely 
natural beatitude. 14 1.Ihis point is of some significance be-
cause it emphasizes the fact that mants natural desire for God 
is not at all natural in the sense of being an innate desire. 
Were it a natural L~ate desire, a sense o£ £rustration would 
necessarily result in a purely natural state. 
According to Father Elter, S.J., the A~sti~¥~ of 
Jansen, which appeared in the year 1(::40, marked a turning point 
in the history o£ natural desire for God. Prior to that period. 
the older scholastics had uniformly taught that tho only per-
fect beatitude man could have was the beatitic vision. The 
..... 
13 
14 
Ibid., 60. 
-Ibid., 61. 
-
15 
beatitude corJlatural to the rational appetite was beatitude 
secund~ quid. Jansen's argument forced Catholic writers into 
-
a position radically different from the older tI'adition. Ac-
cording to Jansen, man has a necessary tendency to perfect 
beatitude. But the only perfect beatitude is the intuitive 
vision of God. Therefore, man has a necessary tendency to the 
intuitive vision ot God. There was a false premise here. The 
scholastics did not wish to question the firs'li premise, that 
man has a necessary tendency topertect beatitude, so they 
denied the second, that the only perfect beatitude was the 
beatific vision. 15 The strength of the eudaemonological argu-
ment lies in the premise which the later soholastics did not 
wish to deny, namely, that man has a. necessary tendenoy to 
perfeet beatitude. The possibility of a natural beatitude 
beoame the important by-prOduct ot this argument over man's 
na.tural desire for the beatific vision. Of course, the impos-
sibility of a purely natural beatitude figures largely in the 
eudaemonological argument. One consequenoe of Jansen's teach-
ing was that the Augustinians were promptly accused of Jansen-
ism when, in the eighteenth century, they taught a natural 
dcaiI's for the beatific vision. Unjustly censored, tlw 
Augustinians taught that as far as appetition is concerned, 
15 
1949, 24. 
Joseph Buckley, S.M.; Man's Last End, st. Louis, 
...............- ................ ~
man does naturally desire the beatific vision. As far as a.t-
tai.ning that vision is concerned, however, man carmot natura.lly 
aoquire it. 16 In the smne century that Jansen wrote, we find 
the Dominican position well established. Both Gotti and 
Bllluart. the leading Thomists of the century, aeeep ted and 
taught the traditional doctrine. 1\1an's desire to see God is 
an elicited, conditional, and ineffioacious desire. It is 
formally a desire to see the author of nature. This desire to 
see God wou.ld cause no sense of frustration in a state of 
purely natural beatitude. B11luart points out that we oannot 
prove that it is possible for r~ to see God; manta desire 
provides only a probable argument in support of his capacity 
to see God. 17 
Just prior to the beginn1ng of the present centu.ry 
Dr. Seati11 wrote the first book dealing exclus1vely with the 
problem of natural. desire for the baa-titic Vision. lIe held 
that man has an obadiental capacity for the beatific vision. 
Because of this obediental capac1 ty, human nature is transcen-
dentally related to the beatific vision. The trat~cendental 
relation 1s in turn the cause of an elicited desire for per-
fect happiness which is implicitly a desire to see God. This 
-.- ... -
16 Bastable, _l'J_a ... tur.;;;;;;,.a.;.;,~-. ~!:!., 66. 
17 Ibid., 70. 
17 
elicited desire is not n free act but is forced by r:lan's nature. 
Thus, man does not have an explicit desire, as Cajetw:l said, but 
he does have an implicit desire for the beatific vision. Expli-
oitly, man seeks perfect happiness. 'In freely elicited desire, 
man is able to elicit a desire to see God because he 1s able to 
elicit a desire for the vision of the first cause. 18 Sestilits 
teaching that man necessarily and naturally desires absolute 
beatitude is pertinent to the eudaemonological argument because 
by affirming that, be necessarily denies that a state of nat-
ural beatitude would be consonant with human nature. 
With Rousse10t, whose theory on natural desire ap-
peared in 1908, we have the beginning of the modern school 
which distinguishes "the order of finality' from tt the order of 
factual realization." and holds that these two orders do not 
coinoide for man. This distinotion harks baok to that of tho 
Augustinians t between the power to desire and the power to ac-
quire. Man, acoording to Housselot, tends toward a goal-. 
supernatural beat1tude--whloh he cannot reach naturally. 
Rousselot held that the human intellect is so constituted that 
it w111 never be at rest until it intuits reality. and, there-
fore until it sees all things in the essence of God. 19 
18 
19 
!b~d., 12. 
Ibid., 114. 
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Following Rousselot, Guy de Broglie held that man's natural de-
sire for beatitude 1s i~plicitly a desire to see God. Since 
the natural desire for beatitude 1s the ultimate end of indiv-
idual acts for beatitude, implicit in every act is the desire 
tor God. It is the same with the intellect's search for truth; 
it is implicitly a search to see all things in God. Finally, 
the desire to see God connotes a velleity that is implicit and 
necessary--necessarybecause it is implicit in every act. 20 
Father Mar~chal further developed the distinction between the 
order of finality and the orde;c> of realization by emphasizi11fj 
the metaphysical tendency towards the beatific vision. This 
basic tendency is to a perfection beyond man's powers. It is 
natural in the sense that it is Q metaphysical urge, although 
its fulfillment depends on the intervention of God. 21 l"ather 
Laporta, O.S.B. reduced this metaphysical tendency to a trans-
cendental relation. He interprets natural desire in two senses 
(1) It connotes the essential and necessary rela.tion 
of a thing to its end. • • • and this is natural 
ontological desire. 
(2) It also connotes an action elicited by the appe-
titive faculty but determined by the nature possess-
ing that faculty. And this is natural elicited 
desire. 
20 Ibid. J 116. 
-
21 Ibid., 119. 
-
~---" -----. 
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• 
Man has a natural desire to see God in the former 
and not in the latter sense of natural desire.. He has 
not a natural elioited desire to see God; for the 
formal object of the will i8 bonulI1 in communi, and not 
the beatific vision, and so tiia wflrdoes not necessar-
ily desire this vision. But he has a natural ontolog-
ioal desire to see God; tor the beatific ~~slon is the 
ultimate perfection or final end o:f man. 
We find this position fully developed in the work of Father 
O.Mahony, O.S.F.C. In his book, The Desire or God, he assumes 
......... ........... ---.... ...................... 
that man has a natural desire for the beati:fic vision and seeks 
to solve the apparent contradiction of a natural desire 1:or an 
object beyond the power of the nature. His solution follows 
the solution of l1ousselot, the distinction between th.e orders 
of finality and factual realization. 
• • • The metaphysical tendenoy of huma.:n natura 
is towards the beatific vision. And, since nature 
is the principle of actiVity, it follows that this 
tendency is implicit in the higher activity or man, 
and can be discovered by metaphysical analysis of the 
naturej object and acts of his intellect and will. 
The tendency of human nature, howevex- .. outstrips its 
powers; for man has only 8.n obediental capacity for 
the beatific Vision, and so, before the advent of 
grace, the tendency of his nature is inefficacious. 23 
1.Vith 01Mahony we conclude our outllne of the history 
of natural desire. In the main we have fOUTld three general 
positions, all of which vary considerably in detail and ter-
minolog;y_ The first holds that man naturally desires to Imow 
22 
23 
Ibid •• 120. 
-
Ibid., l24. 
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God only 1ndi~ectly. A state of purely natural beatitude is 
oonsonant with this position. The second position holds that 
man llat~ally desires to know God directly, but does not have 
the power to do so. Natural beatitude does not satisfy f.1a..'YJ.'S 
nature, according to this position. Finally, the third posi-
tion holds that man naturally desires to l{Uow God directly 
and has the power to do so. Man, therefore, naturally desires 
the beatifio vision. 
With these facts concerning the relationship be-
tween God and the rational appetite in hand, we procoed now 
to study the eudaemonological argument. 
:1 
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CHAPTER II 
PRESENrrATION OF 'rHE EUDAEMONOLOGICAL ARGUMENT 
We have reviewed briefly the history of natural 
desire for God. The eudaemonological argument is baaed on 
that natural desire.. 'l'hat term, however, is hardly univocal, 
and so it is necessary to preface our presentation of tlw 
argument with a clear definition of natural desire. The term 
natural desire connotes a ffcongenltal and abiding relation of 
..... .. 
a nature or faculty to a certain good--it is an ordo e~sen­
tlalis !£ bonum. !-llguo~/t 1 Human nature is a principle of 
activity. This principle Is in potency to the perf'ectiol1 
which belongs to it by reason of its nature. The tendency to 
possess that perf'ection, we call natural desire. This ten-
dency operates on two levels. On the first level, the prtmary 
movem~ent of the will, the appetitive faculty of' the soul, is 
a necessary movement. It is independent of knowledge of the 
object. The weight of nature, as we say, moves the appetite 
to desire necessarily the perfection "Thich is natural to it. 
1 Patrick K. Bastablo, D-.6_s.ir __ e ~~, London, 
21 
22 
.. 
This is natural desire in its striot sense, innate desire. On 
the level of elioited desire, however, the w111 under the in-
fluence of general impulse to seek the perfeotion of the nature 
moves oonsciously under the direotion of the intellect to con-
crete, determined perfeotions. The natura! desir~ we use in 
the eudaemonologieal argument is in the primary sense of the 
te~l, the innate, neoessary desire of the nature for the per-
feotion proper to it. 2 Buokley describes it this way: 
Every potentiality is, of its very nature, an 
intrinsic ordination to its natural fulfillment. 
This order, ordination, and tendenoy of a potency 
toward its fulfillmen't, toward the object that will 
perfeot it, 1s oalled by Scholastics an appetite, 
aERetitus naturalis. The sense of sight is a nat-
ural appetIte ?or color; materia Rruna is a natural 
appetite for forma substantIalIs, and man's faoul-
ties are a natux-al appe£ite tor" their perfeotion. 
However, man can know the things toward which he is 
tending and can st~ive for them consoiously. In 
beings in whioh there is peroeption of attractive 
objeots, there is a speoial penohant or tendency 
toward them, distinct from the intrinsio ordination 
of every potency ot the being to its proper act. 
This tendenoy is an appetite, 1n the proper and 
formal sense of the term. In act, this tendency 1s 
a movement consequent upon the perception of a thing 
as attractive. In potency, this tendency is a spe-
oial faoulty of appetite; it is a power ot~movement 
toward an attractive object as perceived. ~ 
It 1s the intrinsio ordination, therefore, of human nature 
-,-----
2 ;Cbip •• 25. 
3 Joseph Buckley, S.!iI., 21f.Ul t s ~ End, st. Louis, 
1949, l26. 
- --'\-----~~~ 
that 1s the foundation ot the eudaemonolog1oal argument. 
The standard terms and definItions u •• d 1n the 
.uC!,aemonolopteal ar~ment are these: A~t1te, as we l"..ave 
•• en, if'! an ordlnat1on of one thlnF to another. Supernatural 
appet!te 1s one prl")ceed1nrr trom a pr'ne1ple exoeedinp- and ele-
•• tlnr natural powers. Its.0pposlte 18 natural appetite whieh 
i. prnper to the simple pnwer$ o,f a nat\~:re. ftN'sturnl appe-
tite 1s nothtnp, more than an ot'CUnlltlon or relation to that 
wb.1oh ~.a 8u1ten to itself, as, for instanoe, a stone seel-:8 
1 ts lO'Wef!t level Clf rest."4 Natv.ral appet! te is further" 8\1'b-
divided tnto innate "ppet!te and elicited appetite. Innate 
appettte ',8 the necessary tendency of t\n~r be~,nF tt\ the T"~r­
teet!.()n bef1tting '.ts nature and to the exeroise of its 
proper activity_ It does not demand 1n the subject any previou8 
knowledce. E1101t~d QP~etlte is the tendenoy 01' a knowlnp. 
subJect to an objeot bet1.tt'.np the nature. It follows pl'e-
vlo\~.8 eorn1tlon, and J.8 e1the", neoesfJ&:ry or free. Tnnate 
appetite, whioh 1s the t"'l8.'-n tern 1n our f!ttldy, i8 further 
subdtvlded into exlp:ent appetite, an appetite whoae ob,ect 1e 
proportIoned to the natttf'e and due to it, and apt1tudlnal 
-
4 De Vet-., q. es, 8.. 1. Nihil alh'.d est 
appetltul naturan'i quam quaedam lncllnatl0 et ONO ad allquam 
rem slb1 convenientem, slent lapldem 1'err1 ad looum deorft1.tm. 
!£peti~, a..'l appetite for all object not contradictory to the 
nature, but for which. the nature has :no strict right. 5 
Beatitude is a term w::'lich will occur frequently. It 
........ -_. 
haS been variously defined. Boethius calls it: tlA state per-
fect in the possession. of every good. u Thorl.las calls it: 
"The perfect good which completely satisfies the appetite." 
In other words, we are dealing hore with the oupron6 good 
proper to the rational appetite and proportioned to it. It is 
the perfect and perpetual possession of every good necessary 
to perfect and satisfy the rational nature of man. 
Of especial importance to our argument is the defi-
nition of the objects of the faculties. rrhe fOfl'l1!! obJ~<?~ of 
a faculty is that aspect of the object that is attained first 
and in itself and through which the faculty attains any other 
Object. Color, for instance, is the formal object of the 
human eye, and inasmuch as a thi:nG is colored, it is a proper 
object of the eye. The material obJe~ is that which is at-
tained by reason of the forrnal object. st. Thomas describes 
it: 
There is in the object two aspects, the one 
formal, the other material. The formal aspect of 
5 Pedro Descoqs, S.J. I Theologiae Naturalis, II, 
Paris, 1935, 137-145. · . 
------------------------...... 
the object i8 the relation of the objeot to the 
potency or habit, and the material aspect is the 
foundation of the formal, it we take the object ot 
the faculty ot vision, for instance, its formal 
object 1s color, or someth1ng ot that nature, tor 
to the degree that something 1s colored, to that de-
gree it i8 Visible, and the colored body is the 
material object.6 
We have, f1nally, the proper object of a faculty, namely, that 
object which does not exceed the capacity of the faculty and 
can be atta1ned by it naturally. The adequate object, as 
contradist1nguished from the proper, 1s any object capable 
of beIng attained by the faculty, by natural or supernatural 
means, directly or indirectly. 
In order to lay the strongest possible foundation 
for the eudaemonological argument, we shall discuss at some 
lenpth the evidence ot man's desire for beatitude. This 
discussion w111 be based on the thorough treatment of it by' 
Sertillanges 1n his monograph on the knowledge of God, !!! 
~ources Q!.f! Orolance ~ ~.7 Sertillanges gives three 
6 S.D., B! g~., 7th ~d., Taurinena18, Rome, 1942, 
II, 549. In obj3Cto consldel~atu.r' allquld ut forntale at allquid 
ut materiale. Formale autem 1n objecto est secundum quod 
objeotum refertur ad potentlam vdl habltunt: materlale autem 
Id in quo hoc tundatur; ut a1 loquamur de objecto potent1ae 
v181vae objectum eiu8 formale est color, vel allquid hulusmodi, 
1n quantum enim aliquid coloratum est, in tantum vieibile est. 
sed materiale in objecto est corpus cui aocidit color. 
7 A.D. Sertl11anges, ~ Sources ~ £! Crolance 
!a~, Paris, 1913. 
main points as evidence of this desilge. 'rhe first is ::lan's 
desire of never-ending life in order to satisfy all of his de-
sires. The second is the nature of mants intellect, which ex-
tensively and intensively always desires to know more and more. 
~rhe third is the fact of disorder connected with man's exist-
ence which serVes to emphasize his craving for unlim.ited happi-
ness. 8 We shall examine those facts of common experience 
more closely. 
Jiilan desires never-ending life. Poets, philosophers" 
theologians bear witness to man's desire to have permanent pos-
session of lite. It is the bJ.'l6vlty of' life that captures the 
imagination of' people in every age. Life is a shadow" a flmver 
a day, a swift-running river. It is not permanent. And it is 
not the number of years of its course that maltes it so short. 
Lengthen life's span to a thousand years; it becomes relatively 
long. How rapidly again it shrinks, however, with the realiza-
tion that it will necessarily end. As Sertillangea says: UTout 
-
2.!. gut dolt f1nir !l!.!.!l t!!ll.u 9 What man instinctively de-
sires, then, is not a piece of life, but lite itself. He de-
sires unending, indestructible being. Man, touching the etern 
beoause ra.ised above the materia.l swirl around him by his power 
8 
9 
Ibid., 321. 
--
Ibid •• 332. 
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of thought, of reflection, wants eternity of being. Thus, 
powerfully, the proponents offer a fact of universal experi-
enoe to demonstrate man's desire for beatitude. From. this ini-
tial fact, then, the proponent of the eudaemonological arGlxment 
reasons in this way- The desire just described is found in 
every age, among all peoples, in every sort of cordi tion; it 
reveals, therefore, the nature of man. And because it is a 
natural desire, it must reveal a natural object. At this point 
is introduced the prinoiple that such a natural desire oannot 
be frustrated. Aristotle, Plato, Cioero, Augustine, Thomas, 
and all scholastic philosophers have ~eed that a ~atural de-
sire oannot be f~~strated_ This does not mean, of course, that 
every natural desire must necessarily be fulfilled. Rather, 
what is understood 1s that no such desire can absolutelz lack 
L~ object. At least, a real object must be possible. Ob-
viously, therefore, if we grant the proponents of the audaemon-
ologioal argument such a genuine natural desire for their eter-
nal object, we must grant them the validity or their aI"b"Umont 
as a demonstration of the existence of God. 
At this point we must emphasize the fact that the 
euda.emonological argument is based solely on final causality. 
It is essentially a sixth way of proving the existence of God, 
absolutely distinct from efficient causality. It would be to 
28 
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argue from efficient oausality wore we to say that 'l;;h1s nat-
ura.l desire must be caused by stHllo'l;hing eternal beoause it is 
eternal. But we argue from finality if we say that a natural 
desire for an eternal object demonstrates the existenoe of that 
eternal object beoause such a natural object cannot be frus-
trated. The eudaemonological argument is based on finality. 
The second poL~t to be considered is the nature of 
man's rational appetite. Man's appetite in its quest for sat-
isfaotion 1s satisfied only by the appearance of infinity in 
the objeots it seeks. Why is soience deified today? Perhaps, 
it is because tl~ man in the street seems to find hero some-
thing whose power is unlhuited, whose progress is er~less. Tl~ 
scientists have told him to throw guns and God away. Soience 
has touched power in man that has no limit. Why is the dictator 
deified', Because, again, the mixture of power and aocomplish-
ment seems unlimited. So it is with love, with riches; the 
union of both with infinity enllances them and makes mru1 dosire 
them as ends in themselves. At the same time, the finite na-
ture of these objeots explains the inevitable betrayal and dis-
illusionment that results on disoovery of their limitations. 
Their failure but elnphasiaes mants undeniable drive for the 
unlimited. 
-------
10 Ibid., 376. 
-
li'inally, we consider the disorder connected with 
ma.:i'1 t s existence. L1 tera. ture, from "1;118 Gz-eeks to Gz-aham Greene, 
er:lphasizes the constant ex'ternal constraint of man t s milieu 
and the utter insuf.ficiency 01' all that seems capable of' satis-
fying the real exigencies of desiz-e. The rebuff man meets in 
hiS physical milieu needs no profound investigation; it is pat-
ent. Wrapped in the material world, part of it, depending on 
it foz- sustenance and foz- protection, he finds that it contin-
ually revolts against his dominion. His own body suffez-s the 
blight seemingly stamped on all matter. The intez-ior contra-
diction offered by the impotence of the intellect, by the weak-
ness of the will, and by the Instabili ty of the irnagina"tion we 
~~ple evidence of the limitations which confront mants des1re 
for the perfect life. y""ideo mallors. probogue. deteriora. seguor. 
l"inally, the insufficiency of' the things caloulated to satisfy 
man's uz-ge foz- the full life greets us at every tUJ:'n. Failure 
where suooess is expected is disappointing, but when success 
fails to fill, when the gold of expectation turns clay, then 
it 1s that man finds the void of' desire has no bottom. The 
savant finds Imowledge enlpty; the soientist is appalled by vast 
areas yet unexplored; the politioian finds no comfort in con-
quest. After u.:.'1iting the German states and dominating the con-
tinenta.l political scene for deca.des, Bismax-ck sighs: "How 
little joy and satisfaotion the whole affair has brought me. 
NO one loves me for it •.•• I have made no one happy, neither 
myself nor my dear ones." Thus man realizes the InsufficiellCY 
of thi:.n.gs to satisfy his constant desire for perfect happiness. 
Having thus described the natural desire of man, the 
proponents of the eudaemonological argument offer the objeot 
.hlch, they say, 1s alone capable of satisfying that desire. 
The characteristics, they say, are determined by the nature of 
man himself. The object that satisfies that nature must neocs-
.arily be desired for itself. W~ere it desired i'or any other 
reason, it would not be a final end and general motive for all 
other desires. All men must be al,le to attain it. It must 
perfectly satisfy the rational appetite of man. All evil must 
be exoluded i'rom it. And finally, it must be stable and perma .... 
nent. Since it is evident that no created thing could possess 
these characteristics, LYld because some term must be postulated 
tor mants natural desire--if, indeed it is a true natural de-
lire they have drawn--the tL~created, necessary Good must be the 
term of the desire. 12 
There are many approaches to the eudaamonological 
argument as outlined in general above. r£he more common ones 
tollow these patterns. Mants natural and necessary desire for 
-
Ibid .. , 348. 
-Franciscus Antonius Palmabo, ~~odlc~, I, R~~e, 
beatitude is a necessary w1d natural desire for God as final 
end.. God, therefore, must exist. Again, God is the formal, 
specifying object of the intellect and the will. God, there-
fore, must exist. Or, in the order of being, God is the proper, 
specifying object of the human will since it necessarily tends 
to God as to its end. Even if' God, -therefore, is not the for-
mal object of the will as a faculty, still God must be the ob-
ject of the will as a nature, for God is the proper term and 
specifying object of th.e will as a nature. 13 
We have considered rather thoroughly the fact of' a 
desire for perfect happiness and have seen how this is used to 
demonstrate the fact of God' as existence. We ask now whether 
this desire is a natural desire. This, of course, i8 the basic 
issue between the proponents and the adversaries of the argu-
ment. How do we know that this desire is congenital to the 
nature of man? The proponents of the argument offer three char 
acteristics of the desire to prove that it is natural. First 
of all, they say, it is found in all men. All men desire per-
fect happiness. History records the constant effort to excludo 
all evil from life. It is the history of every nation.. Expe-
rience teaches us and universal consent confirms the fact that 
all men desire perfect happiness. The desire is, J~hel~efol"'a, 
13 Ibid .. , 228 .. 
--
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universal. Seoondly, this desire for perfect happiness is in 
. 
all menneoessarill. This is, of course. a neoessity of speci-
fication, not of exercise. A man. in other word~, may simply 
abstain from the thought of happiness J but in the evel1t that he 
does turn his attention to happiness. it is impossible for h±m 
not to desire it. Lessius describes it in this way: 
It is not necessary that everyone thinks about 
beatitude, nor that everyone that does consider it 
elicit a desire for it. 14'01' the will is free and is 
able to abstain from act1ng with regard to any object 
whatsoever. It however 1<1; does actively consider 
beatitude, it can only do so with love and desire 
for it. It''or no one can truthfully and sinceztely sa'Y~ 
I do not desire to be happy; I wish to be unhappy. ~ 
F:1nally. this desire of perfect happiness which is in all men 
is the cause of all their other desires and aspirations. Pre ... 
cisely because a man desires to be happy will he perform this 
or that act which he believes will lead to the happiness he 
desires. Notewo.rthy is the fact that this general intention 
need not be formally expressed during the performance or any 
particular act. Possibly it will be only implicit and virtual. 
One man, for instance, may conceive his happiness to be located 
in a particular place. III using all the means he knows to put 
himself in that place. he may not explicitly think of it, but 
it will nonetheless be the virtual cause of each act leading to 
final possession ot the place. 
14 ~., 229. 
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The desire for beatitude, th.erefore, 1e universal, 
is necessary, is the causs of all other desires, and acoording 
to the proponents ot the eudaemonological argument is shown by 
these characteristics to be natural, i.e., radicated and based 
in nature itself. 
We cOIlSider. finally, the impossibility of frustra-
tion for a natural desire. The principle that no natural de-
sire can be vain is universally valid, says Dascoqs, under the 
following conditions. Such a natural desire need not de facto 
- .... -
be completed; it must admit the possibility of bei:ng completed. 
This possibility of completion, furthermore, must be a positive 
possibility in the order of nature. And the means of achieving 
the end must be supplied by nature. The fact that some moral 
or physioal disorder may frustrate the end does not negate the 
principle. The natural desire, finally, must be an innate, 
necessary tendency. It may be eliCited, but it tns:y not be free 
or elective. 15 Granted these qualifications, we argue to the 
impossibility of frustration either trom the nature of finality 
or from analogy. ~he extrinsic causes of being are the effi-
cient cause and the final causel the .former determ1ning ~ a 
thing is, the latter determining what it is.. Palumbo describes 
-
15 Descoqs, Theolosi~e NaturaliSt 158. 
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the final cause in the se tel"lnS: 
Every agent necessarily acts ro~ a determined end. 
lIe tends, that is, to a dete~nined effect which is 
suitable to h1m. and perfeota h1m. Some good, there-
fore, as end it 1s which determines the agent to act 
rather than to abstain trorp. acting and to seek this 
end rather than IL'1.otb.er. 10 
Such is the nature ot the final cause. In the present instance 
we are considering a natural desire tor beatitude. That is, 
in the operation ot the rational appetite that which determines 
the agent to act and that Which determines the end of the act 
is the tinal cause, beatitude. Beatitude is, therefore, essen-
tial to the <>perat1on ot the rational appetite because without 
it the appetite remains undetermined either to act at all or 
to any speoific act. By denying the final cause, the nature 
is necessarily destroyed. 
Arguing trom analogy, we find that in brute an:Lm.als 
every natural desire has its proper end. For heX'bivoX'ous 
animals there 1s plant life; for carnivorous animals, meat. 
'I'his natural disposition of objeot and appetite ls, ot course, 
in no wise upset by the fact that aocidentally in one instance 
or other the natural end ot a creature may not be available, 
as is explained above. Allalogously, then, we say that were man 
J J 
16 Palumbo, T~~odleea, 226. 
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urged on to perfect happiness by all the foroes of his na.ture 
and yet of all creatures alone deprived of a satisfying term, 
he would certainly be more miserable than brutes and even 
inanimate lite itself. 11 F'rom the nature or finality and 
frolU analogy, consequentl1, we say that no natural. desire can 
be frustrated. 
The traditional form of the eudaemonological argu-
ment 1s given in this wa1 bY' Palumbo: 
We have a natural desire for perfect beatitude, 
or a natural desire to obtain a supreme and perfect 
good, which can sat1sfy all the needs of our soul. 
& Such a. natural desire cannot be inefficacious. 
Ergo: There must exist a supreme and perfect good as 
the term of our de sire. 
& Such a suprem.e and perfect good must be infinite J 
that 1s, God. 8 
Ergo: God does exist. 1 
17 Ibid .•• 22.5. 
-
18 !bid., 222. 
CHAPTEH III 
EUDAE:MONOLOO leAL ARCH.n;IENT 
Positions of adversaries of' the eudaamonological 
argument vary considerably. Some concede it no validity at 
all; others are willing to gr~~t some probable validity. We 
shall indioate the main points of thea. dissentillg positions 
in this ohapter. We want a clear picture of the opposition 
to the argument as it 1s proposed in Ohapter II. 
A brief review of the nature of the intelleot and 
will will serve to clerify the basia issues and bring us im-
mediately to the heart of the matter. We are dealing with nat-
ural desire in a rational being. Beca.use that ra.tional being 
acts through its faoulties, it is the faculties that reveal 
what does and what does not belong to the nature of the being. 
The adversaries scrutinize very closely, therefore, the make-
up of the intellect and will. We consider first of all the 
various objects of these two faoulties. The1 are three: the 
formal object, the proper object, and the adequate Object. 
'rhe formal objeot of a faeul'ty is that objeot whioh defines 
the activity of that faoulty, to whioh 'the faculty is assen-
tially ordered, and which it neoessarily attains in every aat. 
36 
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If God, for instanoe, were the formal object 01' the h.uman will, 
granted the existence of the will, .: t would 00 irnpossible for 
God not to exist. At the same t1.'Ue, because of the nature of 
this formal, speoitylng object, it 1s olear that this is the 
only objeot which allows sueh a oonelusion. Here we appl.y the 
metaphysioal. prinoiple that nothing natural can be absolutely 
frustrated. Granted, therefore, an essential ordination of 
faculty to objeot, that objeot must exist or the nature of the 
faculty 1s frustrated. 
V{hat, then, is the formal objeot ot' the intellect'! 
Even those who defend the validity of the argument answor that 
the forrnal objeot of the hwuan intellect is beips !E. a;eneral. 
In other Vlorda, that wh1ch 1s known first £uld in ltsel1' is 
being in the widest extension of the word. Maher says: ll"~\!lth,in 
the sphere of being is inoluded substance and accident, body 
and spiI1it, creator and creature, actual and possible reallty; 
in fact, everything capable of being in any mea.sure undeI'. 
stood." 1 In extension, therefore, the formal. object of the 
huma.n mind, being in general, does include God. 
And, secondly, what is the proper and speclfyin.g 
object of the human intelleot" Again, all agree that the 
1 1&1cha81 Maher, S. J ., P slcllologZ, 9th ad. J 
New York, 1926, 305. 
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propel' object of the human intellect is the abstract and uni-
versal essences of sensible or material things. Maher puts it 
neatly: "But, although the formal object of th,e intellect em-
braces all forms of bei~3' yet the hmnan intellect has for its 
cormatural, ilUCllediate, or proportionate object, the abstract 
and universal essenoes of sensible or material thlngs .. n2 In 
treating of the proper objeot of the intellect, there is ques-
tion of those things toward which the intellect tends directly 
as opposed to objec.ts whieh it can know only medIately or indi-
rectly. Thus God and pure spirits are not proper objects of 
the human intellect, th.ough, supposi:n,g their eXistence, they 
are contained within the scope of its formal object. 
~o clarity immediately the relation bemveen tl~ 
human intellect and God, ll'U';Ult 3 knowledge of Hira. is attained in 
this fashion. Man cannot intuit directly the divine essence. 
The proposition "God exists" is not immediately evident as far 
as we are concerned. Our idea of God" theI*efore. is analogous 
as opposed to proper. All of our ideas originate in objects 
on the sensible level. By abstraction man forms ideas of' dif'" 
terent perfections. These are proper cOl1Oepts. iJow, by ne-
gating all il1tperfectlon in thesa concepts and by predicating 
2 Ibid., )06. 
-
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them of God as pure perfection man can represent the divine 
essence, not, indeed, properly but at least analogously_ 
At this point it ~uight be tvell to d1.stinguish the 
formal and prO'puI' objects of th.e intellect i'rom its adequate 
object. t.rho former pertain only to the natural order; the 
latter to the supernatural order after the elevation of the 
faculty by grace. 
What is the fornHiil object of the will'? The i'orr:la.l 
object of the will 1s scod !!! wm.eral. tEhia universal concept 
includes all possible good; it is Good conceived abstract;ly a.s 
unlimited good. In extension this object must includo God.. 
Ha.ving reviewed the nattU'>0 or tile objects of intel-
lect and of wlll, we are in a position to cOllsider th.e argu-
ments brought against the eUdael1l0nologlcal argu..."OOnt .. 
li'rom OUIt de£'inltions of the proper and formal objects 
of the intellect it is clear that although a concrete, infinite 
good possibly is contained in tho orbit of -the .t'orm.al object 
of the intelleot, the proper and cOlJ.natural object of that 
faculty offers no oonolusive evidonce of it. That proper ob-
ject is restricted to sensible, material things. AgaLn,as we 
stated just above, the formal object of the will embracing all 
good !:lust include God, the infinite good. But the opponents 
of the eudaemonologioal arg~~ent L~slst that prior to u demon-
r---------. 
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stration of the actual existenae of God, the fact catll10t be 
de31onatl~a.ted that such an ir..finite good is actually verifiod 
in some concrete being. Since we ha.ve no proper concept of 
such e. being, no real argument beyond mere gratuitous assump-
tion can be offered to show tbat this tendency to good in gon-
aral includes the tendency to a concrete 1nfinite good. 
strictly spaalting, thi';~refore, neither the 1"01'1aa1 
object of the intellect nor the fomal object of the vlill dia-
close a natural tendency to a concrete infinite good. In this 
fact the opponents ot.' too Gudaemo.nological argwnent of'fer one 
strong reason for qUGstionlng the fact itself of a. na.tural 
desire for absolute beatitude. What is evident from an e:xami-
nation 01'[;11& fa.eu.lties, according to the adversaries, 1s that 
man's natural and neo6ssa:ry tendency tor happIness is all appe-
tite for universal good rather than a conerete, infinite good. 
It is a good conceived abstractly as an ~~11mited good. There-
fore t before the existence ot God is establishad t says P alw'7l.bo" 
that such a good is verified in some conerete being cW1nOt be 
proved • .3 
In the face ot th.e analysis just given, defenders 
of the argument propose a distinction.. Granted that God is 
3 Palumbo, Theodicea, 299. 
••• J 
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not the 1"01'1':1&1 or proper objec t of the racul ties in tho order 
of aotivity, could he not be the object of those faculties in 
the order of being'? Rere we have the faniliar distinction be-
tween the intellect and will considered. as faculties a..'1od the 
intellect and will considered as na·cures.4 And so, runs the 
argument, granted that infinite good and infinite being are 
not the objects of the intellec t 8.l1d will as faculties, .none-
theless they are the formal and specifying objects of those 
faculties insofar as they are natures. '.rne cause of man t s 
tendency to the infinite 1s the infinity of God to which, !?l 
~ nature, the will is ordered. God must, therefore, eXist; 
otherwise the will would be D!-turall~i frustrated. In other 
words, God is the form.al and proper object of the w.lll as a 
nature. 
" 
The adversaries of the argument reply quite sintply 
that the distinction between the 1It11l as a faculty and the will 
as a nature bas 110 foundation. For wh.atever is said of the 
one must be said of the oth.er; the capacity of the OXle is kn.own 
frOl'Tl the capacity of the otoor. consequently, if God can.not 
be the object of the will as a faculty, He oannot be the objoct 
of the will as a nature. And with this distinction the advor ... 
4 Ibid., 2)0. 
-
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saries of the argument insist time and time again on the prin-
ciple: the infinite gOOd cannot be the formal and propel'> object 
of any created thing. Here 1s how Mal1Ser puts it: 
When a faculty is naturally ordered to the 
proper object of its nature, thare ought to be a 
natural proportion between the raoult;r and the ob-ject. • • . This principle is valid for our human 
intellect, for our will. * • • Rence there should 
be a natural equity between the faculty and its 
natural object, a certain likeness of nature and 
form. How is it possible then to have that like-
ness betweenc::'God. • .and the human intellect and 
will. • • • :;I 
Again, the adversaries note, the fact that the i'ort1al 
Object of the will contains the idea of infinite good in no way 
helps the validity of tb.e argument. It is from other sources 
we know that such an idea is contained in the universal scope 
of good in general. The precise point of the eudaemonological 
argument is to pI*ove that it is contained in that idea illde-
pendent of any other proof. 
Some adversaries of the argument base their objac-
tion on the nature of an elioited appetite. In the natural 
desire for beatitude we are dealing with an elicited appetite • 
• 
~ , , 
:;I Desoogs, 172 .. La ou une puissanoe est naturel1e-
ment ordo.nnee £: I Fobjet propre do sa nature, i1 doit yav01r 
una proportion naturelle entre 1a ;eulssance et ltobjet •••• 
Oe principe vaut pour notre volante humaine, pour notre intel-
ligence •••• 11 doit done 1 avoir entre una puissance at son 
objet naturel une connaturalitas, uno eom.munauta de nature et 
de torme.. Nous demandons alors comment cette cor:rmunaute peut 
atre. possible entre Dian ••• at l'intelligence ou 190 volont~ 
humaine. 
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Now. in order to have an elicited appetite of aJ:lY object a.t 
all.. the intellect must rirst know a:nd present that object to 
the will. Consequently, if the will Vlould tend neoessarily 
to an infinite good, God, it is necessary that the intollect 
should preconceive that infinite object as existil1g and as 
necessQ.%'y to obtain perfect happiness" Knowledge of God neces-
sarily preoedes the existence of the apPetite 1'or Hint as the 
ultimate end of the appet1te. Too existence of God, thorei'ore, 
according to Palumbo, is a presuppositIon and not a consequa.nce 
of the appetite. 6 
Perhaps the most recurrent objection to the eudae-
monoloC; cal argument is that emphasizing the lack of propor-
tion between the intellect, the wIll, and transcendent Good. 
We have the finite nature of these faoulties contrasted to the 
infInite nature of wbat tbG proponent. of tite argument would 
oall the natural object. Something &ssentia.lly finite is 
paired off with something 1nf1nlte. What the adversaries ab ... 
ject to is evident. The rattonal faoultles are not propor-
tioned to such an objeot, and this is true even if the object 
is granted to exist. Elicited acts for beatitude cannot pro-
ceed from the human intellect and. will for this is an object 
6 Franeiscus Antonius Palurllbo, 'rheodieea, :ears Prilll8. 
Rorne, 194,2, 228. .._" , 
• 
in such a way that they manU'est an essential need of tb.ose 
faculties. At most, they can demonstrate an inefficacious 
desire, and, of course, tho actual existence of such an object 
cannot be proved from an inefficacious desire. 7 
r.creating this matter of proportion, Palumbo is quite 
strong.. He states that since the will for its part is finite 
while its direction in this instance is to an lnfinite object 
which completely exceeds its natural capacity, the whole argu-
Ulent is seemingly based on the sU"pposition that the will is a 
divine faeu~ty. This 1s the supposition most of the adver-
saries of the argument attack. They argue that the result of 
this hypothesis would be to make the human intellect and will 
tend positively to an intuitive vision of the infinite wld to 
a real, essential possession or it on the purely natural plano. 
If' the need were absolute. if our nature were utterly unintel-
ligible without it, we might argue to the need of such a. term. 
l{owever, this conclusion, say the adversaries, is not only 
improbable, but it seems absolutely impossible since hUUl8n 
nature seems altogether unproportloned to such &"1 el1d. 8 
To avoid holding an explicit desire for en object 
7 Pedro Deseoqa, S.J., Ppaelectlo1les Irheologiae 
Naturalis, Tomus Secundus, Paris, I93!;, 153. 
1IfI7~""" 
8 Palumbo, '.ch.eod1cea., 229. 
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olearly not proportloX'led to the faculty, the proponents of the 
argument make this oase. The absolute good in questIon Is not 
known by way of abstractlon, but, rather, the will im.mediately-
although Implleit--deaires that absolute Bood as real and as 
ooncrete. Now this seema to hark back to the distinction men-
tioned above between the will as a nature and the wl11 as a 
faculty. The answer 1s the same. The nature of anything Is 
revealed by its acts. We know the nature of a faculty by what 
it does. On the one band we have a finite nature; on the other 
an infinite term. What positive proof. the adVersaries repeat, 
Is there that the former is able to tend to a real possession 
of the latter? The only proof offered 1s the desire itself 
Which 1s quite possibly purely subjective and 111usory. It is 
precisely the distance betweem sucb a fln! te fa.culty and the 
infinite term that is the crux of the matter. This is the dis-
proportion the adversaries corlla back to as the foundation of 
their objections and the cause of their mistrust of the argu-
mente 
In spite of the faot that the formal objects of the 
human intellect and w111 offer little support to the argument. 
In spite of the disproportion between the finite and the in-
finite, the fact yet remains that man does as a matter of uni-
versal experience have a strol~ tendency toward absolute sat-
r~--------------------------------~ 
isfaotion. On that tendenoy it is th.at the strength of the 
argument rests. If' those who 'propose the strongest argwllents 
against this proof' for the existenoe of God seem to bend over 
backward to preserve its va11dity--wltness Desooqs after two 
soore pages which tear it apart bit by bit, attesting to its 
apologetio value--it is the very force of the universal ten-
denoy to absolute satlst'action that breeds this philosophic 
reluo tane e • 
Deseoqs br1ngs matters mostly ·to a head by reduoi.rAg 
to three the oriteria which test t he validity of' the universal 
tendenoy to absolute satisfaotiorl as a prootfor the exiatonce 
of God. To prove the possibility of tile infinite Good from 
such a tendenoy it 1.8 neoessary either (1) to see that the 
Infinite is positively possible in Itself, or (2) to see its 
nature tmmedlately in itselt·-o.ntologism, o~ (3) to SGe that 
the motl.on toward indefinite good would not 00 intelligible 
~ 
in the unity of transcendental good, but only in transeendent 
Good. 9 In treating the third hypothesis, Descoqs comes to 
the heart ot his argument. The defenders olaim that an in-
finite series in final causes is equally as repugnant as ~1 
infinite series in effioient causes. A final cause _8 as 
necessary as an effioient cause.. Consequently, there mur£rt 
be a final term which corresponds perfeotly to the potency 
9 Desooqs, Praeleotiones. 166. 
....... ,..1& •• • _ .. 
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and the capacity of the nature. Irhere must exist, therefore, 
a term which corresponds to the natural appetite for beatitude 
found only in transcendent Good. Vescoqs' answer .. -and it 
forces to the surface the basic issues in the minds of the 
adversaries of the argument··ls this. Such a natural appetite 
rllust have its proper end only if the ontological order has 
already been established. Again, in the. purely logioal order 
such an appetite must be satisf.1ed only if a .first efficient 
cause has been proved. However, in too purely 10g2.0&l order 
until a first efficient cause haa been proved, the necessity 
of such a term is conceded by Descoqs only with probabl11ty.10 
In rejecting th.e eudaemonologioal argument, Desooqs 
follows, in the main, the line of diffioulties we have already 
stated. In the first plaoe, the tendency itself is not such 
that only the transoendent term e:cll possibly explain it. 
Secondly, tbe disproportion between the nature of the faculty 
and the nature of the term makes certitude highly questionable. 
Thirdly, neither the will nor the intellect requires in its 
formal object such a term. And finally, the term of the fae-
ulties oan be explained satisfaotorily in another way. 
A tinal matter to be eonsidered in conneotion with 
10 Desooqs,Praelectlolles, 167 • 
. ... 
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the position of the adversaries is their explanation or the 
dynamism of the intellect and -the will. We can introduce the 
problem with this question proposed by defenders of 'the argu-
ment: how can the objeot which. directs the tendencies ot the 
will be an abstract object? '.rhe good as such necossarily im-
plies simple good. And if goodness as such. (bonwil. ~~) 1s 
the object of the will, that object necessarily implies abso-
lute good (bon~ !...1m.;eliolt!£.) Adversaries of the argument 
find the answer to this proposition in a further analysia of 
the mechanism of the Vllll. trhat tb.e formal object of the wtll 
1s goodness in general is evident. That this formal object 
necessarily iiTlp11as absolute good is not evident. The formal 
object is the aspect under which a concrete determined object 
1s desired.. r1'he object of the human will remains finite, 
indefinite. and concrete.. The will itself terc:lna.tl:rl[; always 
in its formal objeot, the good, need never be absolutely 
satisfied.11 The fact that we constantly rise above tho goods 
which we do gain, say the ad~"ersarie5. does not necessarily 
W/~~ 
mean that this tendency of the" must end in trL:.Iscendent 13000., 
but simply that we retain the liberty of the good in General. 
rthat is, that we oontinue to act freely. r.Ehat £!Qodnoss does Q 
11 Descoqs, Praelectiones, 181. 
r 
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not of course exclude transcendent aood, but from the mechan-
ism of the will itself such an object cannot be proved. Each 
particular act of volition and intellection has its sufficient 
reason in the continued freedom. to consider finite objects 
under the aspeot of the true and the good.. the aspect under 
which !llan' s faculties attain their material object. 
Concerning the f1na.lism of a tendency to the indefi-
nite, Descoqs bas this to say: It is true that no finite good 
C8..L"l satisty the desire of man for beatl. tude 11' one suppose 
beatitude to be a static oondition. But could not that desire 
of man be satisfied by a dynamic pursuit of finite, ever-
renewed goods? The nature ot the desire leads man always to 
the finite, indefinite good. The indefinite implies a capa-
city never filled. The very la.ck of satisfaction 1s a condi-
tion of our activity_ HOW' is it possible, therefore, to con-
clude with certitude that the tend.ency to beatitude--to Which 
our faculties are 1n no way proportioned--must have for its 
term an infinite. positive good'? 12 
In conclusion, it 1s well to note that we are not 
concerned here with the validity of the principle It In essen-
tials nature cannot be defeetive.~l It is ad."llltted that the 
12 Deseoqs, Praelectlones, 183. 
.,. "' ... 
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princ iple of sufficient reason requil"'6s us to reoo6::1ize the 
equal validity of the prinoiple of final causallty with that 
of effioient causality. GrM.ted a positive natural tendency, 
there must be a term cOl~·esponding to it. To deny this is t,O 
make human nature unintelligible. The basic difficulty is one 
of' fact. Does an analysis of our natural tendenoies reveal 
that we do tend to a good that is positive, transoendent, and 
concrete, so that there must exist a term corresponding to 
that natural desire? The validity of the eudaomonologlcnl 
argument rests on the answer to this question. .suoh an. object 
would have to be objectively possible. That is, the object's 
souroe would have to be the concrete finite ol:~der since there 
is no apriori foundation .for it in the dynamism of tho will. 
It would have to be subjectively possible. Soma proportion 
would have to be proved between the finite faculty and the 
infinite object. 
-• 
CHAPT1~~H IV 
We have weighed the eudaemonologieal argumen.t rather 
thoroughly. Its strong po1nt Is the insistent craving of r:lan 
for unlimited happiness. This oraving Is called a natural 
desire. By natural desire we understand rul ordination of the 
rational appetite toward its natural object. This ordina.tion 
is an appetite in the forma.l sense of the term, i.e. percep-
tiOn of' the proper object and motion toward it. The intelleet 
presents the object; the will deslres the object. Inasrllueh as 
this desire for happiness is a natural deSire, it cannot fail 
of' its object. No truly natural desire can be vain. Because 
the term of the desire 1s beatitude, ~~d therefore God, the 
existence of God follows necessarily !'rom the fact of the 1:'"!l1t-
ural desire. This, in outlule, is the proposed sixth way of 
demonstrating the existence of God. 
The adversaries of this eudaemonological argur:l.cnt 
do not question the metaphysical oel.~taillty of the principle 
which affirms the impossibility of absolute frustration in a 
des:i.re of this kind. 1"01" do they deny the infinite capacity 
51 
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of the ratIonal appetIte. 'l'na ro.oot point lies in thb formal 
and proportioned object of that appetite. From the propor-
tioned object of the appetite 1s it possible to demonstrate 
with certitude the existence of God? What is the real, pro-
portioned object of the rational appetite from which we can 
define its natural desire? The adversaries etnphasize the lack 
of pl'oportlon between the finite faculty· and the infinite ob-
ject proposed by the eudaemonological argument. 
We shall exam.ille carefully the principle issues in 
the present chapter. We shall review tbe partieular arguments 
of authorities on both sides. 'lie shall give a S\..'U'Ih"l1.S.ry of the 
critical issues at the end of the chapter and attempt some 
d$finl te conclusion based on this study. 
The investigation will necessarily earry us into 
the current dispute about natural desire for the beatific 
vision. Only indirectly w111 that discussion of the correct 
interpretation of t he texts of st. Thomas oontribute to the 
present problem of a sixth way. It might be well to preface 
our use ot matter taken trom that eontrover.sy by remarking 
that whatever use is made ot it w111 not prejudge the problem 
of the oorreot interpretation of Thomas, nor will it presup-
pose the correctness ot any particular opinion. 
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It will be advantageous to olear up several ooncepts 
at the outset of this chapter. We single out first for olar-
ifioation the distinction between the metaphysical and the psy-
chological orders. What do we mean by the metaphysical order 
as distinguished from the psychologioal order? 'rhe meta.phy-
sioal order is on the third and highest level of abstraction. 
It considers being a.s such, the relations that exist, there-
fore, between being created and uncreated. The psychological 
order, on the other hand, is on tl~ first level of abstraction. 
In the case of man, it abstraots from the individual and con-
siders all the causes of movement and especiaJ.ly the self 
movement that oomes from. rational appetite.. In the metaphys-
ical order, then, man is considered as related to a.ll being 
and as passively moved in rela.tion to them. In the psyoholog-
ical order man is considered as related to an end which he 
consciously chooses as proportioned to his faculties. l In the 
metaphysical order man's action and goal are determined by God. 
Ma.n 1s passive. In the psychologica.l order, oonsequent on the 
general movement of God" man determines himself. r~an is ac-
tive. Concerning th1s distinction, Bueltley says: 
• •• In the metaphysIcal order, we may considoras 
partIcipated beings the created goods which man desires, 
1 Joseph Buokley, S.M., ~ant~ ~ ~, st. Louis, 
1949, 97. 
r 
which derive their goodness trom the goodness of 
God; so that Inconsidering the objects man de-
sires, not as man desires tl~m but as they are in 
their metaphysical implications, we may say that 
in desiring created goods, man desires God, in 
whose goodneas these created goods share. • . • 
In the psyohological order, on the contrary, man 
is considered aotive and. cOl'lseious, tending toward 
an end viewed as adapted to man's powers and neor; 
'seen, in other words, from man t s point of view. 
In one instance, consequently, God determines the fllovernent of 
man; in the other, man determines the movement of man. Are 
the two movements identical or different? As far as the move-
ment itself is concerned, they are the same. The formal ob-
ject, however, of the movement may be different. Buckley 
explains the distinction this way: 
God could not create anything except for the sake of 
His own goodness. But, if Godoreated all things 
for the sake of .His goodness as end, then all things 
are ordained to God's goodness as their end. This 
does not mean, however, that creature.s eitner should 
tend toward Godls goodness as such by conscious aot 
or do so by natural appetite. The purpose of an 
action and corresponding passion, or reception of 
the action, are identical in re, not necessarily in 
aspect.) ----
On the metaphysical plane, therefore, the divine goodness is 
the efficient, the exemplary, and the final cause of avery 
being" Every movement toward any of these oreated participa ... 
tions ol' the dIvine goodness is, on that plane, an eXplicit 
2 Ibid., 98. 
-
Ibid., 99. 
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movement toward the divine goocuJ,esa. On the psychological 
plane, on the other hand, the same movement is explicitly de-
termined by the intention of the rational appetite, in the 
case ot man, and this mayor nlay not be the divine goodness. 
Buckley puts it clearly: 
Man 1s moved by nature--this .first and funda-
mental act of the will 1s natural and necessary-· 
toward good in general (object) and beatitude in 
general (end.) By virtue ot this first movement, 
man moves himself toward particular good objects, 
choosing and deteI'minlng in what he is to seek h1s 
beatitude. It man is Nally to satisfy and fulfill 
his natural cravings and powers (man as t?,at,;1ens) 11 
he must, indeed, direct himself (man as !!Sen,s) 
toward those values which respond to his natural 
and reasonable tendencies. But, as a free agent, 
man 1s able to set his choice on mel'e apparent 
goods and false values. There is no psychological 
nor even moral necessity .for man to adopt in his 
actions the same point of view as God. has with 
regard to the purpose of man f s ac t s. 4 
The importance and Significance of this distinction is obvious. 
The va.lidity of the eudaemonological argument must be estab-
lished on the psychological plane. At the same time .. the 
temptation to sidle into the metaphysioal order is attractive. 
Beoause the l'elation of the mind to Gad is, in part, 
the focal point of the present diSCUSSion, the second matter 
tor study 1s man's knowledge of God. The knowledge or contem-
plation ot God is ot varying kinds and degrees. The first 1s 
that common to the majority of men. It is cor~used and subject 
4 Ibid., 102. 
-
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to error. The second, scientific in its approach, is acquired 
by demonstration. It 1s a tully rational approach to God and 
reaults in a negative .... positive concept telling us what God is 
not. The third is on the higher level of faith and revelation. 
It affords us posl tive knowledge of God. 'rho tourth is the 
knowledge of God that is proper to pure spirits and disembodied 
souls. And, finally, the most perfect of all knowledge, that 
of direct vision of the dIvine essence. Of these ways of' 
knowing God, the first three are proper to man in his present 
condition. Since the eudaemonological argume.ut is strictly 
on the philosophical plane, the third way of faith and revela~ 
tlon is not pertinent. Ruling out the first type, that of the 
confused knowledge, we find that the present disoussion con-
cerns itself with the IJocond kind of knowledge of God. That 
is the properly rational approach to liim. The heart of the 
ugument is to analyze the relation between the mind--an.d 
therefore the rational appetite--and Qod. 5 
Any discussion ot the validity 01' the eudaemonolog-
1eal argument centers sooner or later on the formal objects 
of the intellect and the w1.ll and more part.eularly on tbC 
precise meaning of these objects, universal good and universal 
5 Antoninu$ Finili, o.p. t "Natural Deslre,tl 
Dominican Studies, Oxford, I, October, 1948, 319. , 
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truth (bonum universale at varum. universals.) L1::1iting our 
........ -- .. . .......... --..-... ....... 
discussion to the will for the moment, we have three possible 
interpretations of the term ~vers~! soo:!. It may mean uni-
versal good in the order of being (bon~ universale .!B !ssando. 
That 1s, subsistent good, God. AgaIn, it may be universal 
good in the order of predication, which by reason of its exten-
sion 1s predicated univocall,. or analogioally of any good. 
This 1s the bonum ~~iversale ~ predic~do. Finally, it ~ay 
mean general universal good, whioh is the formal object of the 
will. This is the bonUt,!! unlversal~ !a sener,e. 6 Too necessity 
of care in using the term. universal 600S is apparent. If' We 
define the tendency of the rational appetite by the universal 
good in the order of being" God, that ls, there oan be no dis-
pute about the validity ot the eudaemonologieal argumont. 
However, the universal good referred to as the object of tho 
w111 18 not the .b.o.num .. ~~1ver$ale !n essend2; it is not the 
bOnum universal! ~ pyedlcan.do, which is the logical universal; 
it is the !!.on~ univ~rsa.f~ !!! g~Jqere, the metaphysioal univer-
sal. Buckley desoribes 1t as n good in the un,1versality of its 
analogical character." 7 In other words, whatever object is 
.. 
6 Buokley, M~1'a Last End, 128. ;;...;;,;;;;;;.;....;;;.---
r 
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the tEn"!,! of an act of the will, that object 18 chosen tmder 
the aspect of good. And in the seale of being, everything 
that is talls under the scope ot this fo~nal object of the 
will either directly or analogic'al1y. 
Finally, we subject to clarific·ation once again the 
objects of the rational appetite. We have defined the !ormal 
0i?.1ect as the particular aspecit under which the faculty at .... 
tains its object. As explained a.bove, being in general 1s 
the formal object of the intellect; good in general is the 
formal object of.' the will. The proper objec1i is 'that object 
which is proportioned to the powers of the faculty in its 
given condition. For the intellect this proper object is the 
essence of a material thing; for the will it is any good thus 
presented by the intellect. Finally, the adequate object of 
the faculty comprehends the complete extension of the capacity 
ot the faculty. For the intellact anything in thB seale of 
being 1s embraced 11_ its adequate object; the will led by 
the intellect 1s equally universal. The Significance of these 
distinctions lies in this) that the present discussion is lim-
ited to the proper and proportioned object ot the rational 
appetite. That God 1s included in the adequate object of the 
intellect is t~e. But the very point of the eudaemonological 
argument is to demonstra:te, independently of any other proof, 
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that such a determined conoept does belong to the indeter-
mined range of the adequate objeot .. 
To summarize these introductory remarks then, we 
are trying to ascertain the validity of a sixth way which is 
based on the natural desire of rational. appetite in its pres-
ent oondition. The argument is based on the proportioned 
Object of the faculty; it 1s on ths psychological plane; 
finally_ the formal object of the rational appetite Is bonum 
universals in ganer.!. These ~e the conditions on which the 
proof is based. 
The adversaries of the eudaemonological argument 
stress in partioular two points.. The first is the lack of 
proportion between the finite faculty and the infinite objeot 
if we olaim a natural desire tor God. rrhe second Is the 
nature of the formal and proportioned object itself.. r£hat 
objeot is not God. How do too proponents of the argu.ment 
handle the difficulty of lacit of' proportion? Garrigou-
Lagrange presents one way of doing it. We shall review the 
theory 01' Garrlgou·Lagrange 1n general and then diseuss this 
particular point 01' proportion. 
In his monograph on the realism of the principle of 
finality, published in 1932, 8 Garrigou-Lagrange expounds very 
8 P. Reg., Garrigou-Lagrange, O.P., !!!. R~alisme !2!! 
f.~ineiEE{ B! F'1na11t!, paris, 1932. 
r 
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carefully the possibility o£ a sixth way. Although thoro 1s 
some evidence that he has since el~ed his position somewllat, 
his oleaI' and forceful explanation ot the argument warrants 
study. 9 
In outline. Garr1gou-Lagrange follows the main lines 
of the argument as presented above. The basic fact is that 
limited goods do not and cannot satisfy.the appetite of man. 
Neither external goods nor internal goods do satisfy, whether 
they be of a material or a spiritual nature. But these lim-
ited goods do show man something. On the metaphysical pl8.J.'1G 
they point out by their limited perfection a cause which is 
necessarily unlimited in perteo·tion. Beyond this, on the 
psychological plane their inability to satisfy the appetite 
of man demonstl"ates the need of an ob3ect that can satis!'y 
the appetite. This is no longer a question 01" causality; 
rather, it is one of ~.l9!litZ. Garrigou-Lagrange quotes 
Thomas: 
The objec,t 2! the w111, which is the appetite 
or man, is unlversatiioog. just as the object of 
the intellect Is unIversal truth" It is clear from 
this that nothing Is able to sa~isry the will of 
9 See Buckley f Man t s ~ ~, It Foreword. tJ 
man except universal good which is not tound in 
any craB ted thing but only 1!!~. .. • • 10 
Ue then comments: 
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Is there not in the natural desire for happiness 
a proof contained implicitly in the fourth way of 
Saint Thomas with which we are at present concerned 
but which 1s based on the 12r1nciple of tlnalit;t; 
"every agent acts for an end; a naiur-al !esIre can-
not be inefficacious". Gould it be that the meta-
phys1cal validity of this principle is less oertain 
than the prinoiple of efficient causality? And is 
it not just as certain without the existence of God 
having been proved, since 1t 1s impossible to have 
efficient causality or desire without finality? 11 
Garr1gou-Lagrange goes some length in explori:rlg the poss1bll1t 
of satisfying the appetite by limited good. From experience 
~"ld from the nature of the rational appetite, he finds that it 
1s 1mpossible. The on11 object that w111 satisty the appetite 
must be real; it must be extra-mental-.beeause man doe.s not 
10 Garrigou-Lagrange, I.e Rea11em.e, 262. --Obiee tum 
aut!!! voluntatis, quae est appetitus h.'iiiianua, est lIDlve:rsa~e' 
bonum. siout obiectum Intelleotus est un1versale VGrum. Ex 
quo patet, quod nihil poteat quletara YOluntatem homtnis, nisi 
bonum unlversale, quod non Invenltur in allquo creato, sad 
..... so .... l..... UJn ......· !!l Deo. • • • 
11 lbl~., 262. ··Nty a-t-il pas la, dans 1e desir 
naturel <iu bonneur, una preuve il':Ipliclterllent eontellue dans 1a 4a via de saint Thomas dont noua parlions , l'instant, mais 
que .'expllelte par 10 E:r:t1nci1e de tinalite "tout agent aglt pour une tin; un desir nature· -ne pauli 8fire vain" It La valeur 
metapnysique de eft princ1pe eerait-ella moina eertaine que 
celle du prinoipe de causalite efficiente? N'est-elle pas 
aussi certains avant meme d'avoir preuve ltexistence de Diau, 
pulaqu'11 ne peut y avoir d t eftlcienee et mame de deslr sans 
flna.lltey 
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tend to an abstract good, and i'ti must be infinite. Absolute 
good must therefore necessarily be its object and absolute 
good must necessarily exist. He says: 
• • • Thus it follows that mall, pursuing not 
an abstract lde~ 2!sood ~ 1'&8.+ ~oOd which!! 
contained !a thin&~' cannot discover his true beati-
~ !n ani tinl~e 2!: limited sood, but only in the 
Supreme Good (bonmn universals in essendo et in 
causando;:-I2 . 
Garrlgou offers the usual m.inor of the argut:lent, 
that such a natural desire calmot be vain. To prove that a 
natural desire cannot be vain, he uses the metaph.ysical argu ... 
ment and that based on a.naJ.ogy with nature to prove that a 
natural desire canr.t.ot be 1ne·ftlcaclous. The metaphysical 
argument is too usual examination ot the terms asent and ~. 
Every agent tends to same determined thing which is suitable 
to it. The end 1s precisely that dete:rmined good. Without 
the end. there is neither sufficient reason tor the agent to 
act at all nor for it to act in a. particular way. Thus the 
prinoiple has ontological validity equal to that or the prin-
ciple ot efficiency.1J 
12 Ibid., 265.--••• 11 sten suit que lthQlli~e, 
tendant non pa...-veX"$ l'idee abstralte du bien" mais vers ls 
I --bien reel 'lu1 m 2.!E..! ~ choses, ne peut trouver sa vI'aie 
bea.titude en aueun bien tin! ou lil1litc£, mais seulament dal'l8 
........ r ............... ~ ...... · .... 
1& Souvera~ ~ (bonum ¥-lliversale !a ess2ndo 21 .!!! causan,do). 
13 ~ •• 270. 
Garrigou-Lagrange qualifies the object of manls 
natural desire with two notes. In the first place, that object 
must be real. It is necessarily real because, granted that 
truth. 1s formally in the mind, th.e good is formally in things. 
The good which we na.turally seek, therefore, will be real 
extra-mental good. Secondly, that natural object will be one 
thing. 'rha assertion that it m.ight possibly be $. succession 
of finite goods, a mere collection, 1s illusory. For the 
question 1s not one of quantIty but rather of quality_ 
Garrlgou-LagrL~ge says: 
Quantity is not material to the question; the 
point at stake here 1s the qual.lty ot the good; for 
one might multiply ~ 1ntinitum finite goods with-
out thereby producing ~a.bsorute Good, without 
imperfection which i8 oonoeived by the intellect 
and acoordingly desired by the w111.. that is the 
esser.;.tial reason for the trustration which dismays 
the worldling. He travels the surface of the earth; 
he turns first to one creature and then another, and 
thus it goes wltho!:\t his ever beL'1g fully satisfied 
and really happy. ~ 
Thus Garrlgou-Lagrange underlines the oneness of the true ob-
ject of the will. No matter how multiplied, many objects will 
not satisfy it. 
-----_.-
14 Ibid., 272.·-La quantit' ne fait rlen a ltaffair 
~l stagit lei de la qualit' du bien; m3ma s1 l'on mu~t1plialt 
a ltinfini tous les biens finis, 1ls ne constltueraient pas le 
Bien pur, sans melange, que notre intelligence conyo1t, at que 
par suite, notre vOlonte deaire. ctest 1a raison profonde de 
l 1ennul qU'eprouvent lea mondains, qutils tratnant sur toutes 
lea plages du monde; i18 se portent Vel'S une creature, puis 
vers une aut~e& at ainsl de suite, sans qu'lls soient jamals 
vraiment satlsraits, at veritablement heureux. 
l:<'inally, the key question. Garrigou"'Lagrange asks: 
ltSfensuit-il que notre desir naturel du bonhe~ exige que nous 
arrivions i. la vision immediate du Dlen Souvera,ln Bien'?u His 
tl1.£ullement.u15 He continues: 
But much below the immediate vision of the divine 
essence, and much below the Christian Faith, there is 
a natural !nowle~ !! go~, ~he author of nature, 
whIch arfords us he proo s lor his existence. 
Moreover, except th.at original sin has rendered 
our moral powers W':UI,k, that natural knowledge of God 
would afford us L~ efficacious natural love of God, 
the author of nature, of God, the supreme Good, nat-
urally known. 10 
It is this part of the theory of Garrigou-Lagrange--that mants 
natural desire is tor a natural vision of God, rather than a 
supernatural vision, that will be the tocal point for tho dis-
cussion that follows. The question is now limited by Garrigou 
Lagrange to natural knowledge.. And it the eudaemonolog1cal 
argument can draw on this source, there'w!ll be no longer any 
15 Ibid •• 280. 
-
16 Ibid., 280. -~a1s tres au-dessous de la vision 
immediate de lieaienee divine, at tr~a au ... dessous de la .f01 
cbr't1enue, i1 l' a !! conn&issance naturelle ~ !2.!!!l, auteur 
de 1a nature, celle que nous donnent le8 preuves de son 
existence. 
Et s1 le p$ehe origin~ n 1 ava1t pas attaibli nos 
forces morales, cette connaissanee naturelle de Dieu noua 
pemettra1t d'arr1ver ~ un amour naturel efficace de Diau, 
auteur de le. nature, de Dieu, souvera:;n Bien, naturellement 
connu. 
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diffioulty of lack of proportion between a finite f'aculty L't1d 
an infinite objeot precisely because the mode 01' possession 
will be natural. Nature finds perfect satisfaction in a nat-
ural end. 
Why does Garrigou.r~ange offer this solution; 
namely, the divine goodness naturally known as the tex-m ot the 
rational appetite? Simply because he insists OIl perfect sat-
istaction of the appetite. which. only the divine goodness can 
give. and because he stays within the resources of t~ nature. 
It 1s rather interesting to note that the much belabored point 
of the 1nsufflcien.t satisfaction of'fered by finite objeots is 
one quite readily accepted by the adVersaries of the al~gument. 
Heither side denies that abs?l-~ satisfaction is impossible 
short of possession of the infinite object. Now the agreement 
of the adversaries on this point raises one important issue. 
Is 1t possible that a faculty can exist without the potential-
ity ot earfect !i~tis!aotl,?p. on the natural plane? The adver ... 
saries sa'1-"'are forced to ma1ntain ... that that is possible. 
Garrigou-Lagrarlge says that it 1s impossible. 'rhe appetite 
must be 2ertect~1 satisfied. He is torced, therefore, to·hold 
that the dlvine goodness, whlch alone oan satlsfy the appetlte, 
is the term of the rational appetite. The position 1s s1rlple. 
Because the object 1s absolute good, the nature 1s perfectly 
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satisfIed. Because the possession is natura.l, according to 
Garrigou-Lagrange, there is no d1ffleulty about proportIon be-
tween finite faoulty and infinite object. Thus, the main dif-
ficulty of the adversaries 1s sidestepped. It seems rather 
clear, however, that by thus avoiding the difficulty of propor-
tion, Garrlgou"'Lagrange steps into a greater one. l*'or it 1s 
difficult to understand how natura.l possession of God oan be 
the absolute satisfaction his major demands. We have seen 
........ , 
above that be requires perfect satisfaction of the rational 
appetite. He insists that manls natural desire will be satis'" 
fied only by complete possession of the bonum universale in 
t - ...... 
asssndo, universal good, that is, in the order of being. To 
satisfy this need of nature, he brings forward now a. natural 
possession of that universal good. 
Let us consider carefully the hnpllcatlons of this 
position. We have outlined above the rela:tion 01' the mind to 
God. 17 We have reViewed the six ways in Which man can know 
God. We have seen that the sixth way, direct vision 01." the 
divine essence, 1s the only one which affords direct and per-
tect knowl.edge of Him. But we have seen too that the seco:nd 
manner of knowing Him is the m9llll.er proper to man in his 
17 See this ohapter, 5. 
present condition and proper, too, to the present argrrraent. 
This seeond mL~er is the rational approach Which by negative-
positive concepts comes to aom.e indirect knowledge of God. 
With these points in mind, let us review this theory of 
Garrigou·Lagrange. 
In the first plaeo. this natural possession o£ God 
eannot be the perfect satisfaction that .Garrlgou-Lagrru:lgG in-
sists on in his treatment of the natural desire ot man for hap-
piness. The object of that natural desire he has described in 
these torms: bonum universale. 16 Souverain Bien (bonum 
db· iJ ..... ........... ............... IS 
un1v;,rsa;Le !B esse~E. !! !E: gausandp), and !!. ~ pur, !!ill! 
m.e1anse. Having insisted on perfect satisfaction of the appe-
tite and baving provided the only object capable of giving 
that satisfaction, be otters not pertect posseSSion as ~l& to 
of Dum's desire, but simply possession consonant with the nat-
ural power of the intellect. Thus he offers an unlimited appe-
tite, an unlimited object, and a limited union of the two. 
What are the limitations'! M.ant s possession of the supranle 
good will be ind.irect ox- analogical. Dil-ectl,., the intellect 
still has not possessed the supreme good. The concept of the 
supreme good will be negative. For. as we have seen. the pos-
itive part of the concept, the perfection itself. is taken 
directly from the finite objects proportionate to the intel-
lect. Having denied L~ limit to this finite perfection, man 
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predicates it ot God. It mu.st be emphasized that the mind has 
conceived only tinite perfection. It is not a matter of more 
or less; it 1s a question here of quality. That God is pure 
perfeetlon, the mind knows; but just what p1l.re perfection is, 
it does not know. The difficulty ls,of course, th.at suoh in-
dlreot,analogical knowledge cannot properly satisfy the mind. 
The theory seems to be imperfect in this first respeot then, 
that wh.11e se.emingly demonstrating a natural desire for the 
supreme good--and therefore fitting perfectly the eudaemono-
logical argument.,. .. it never satisfies that natural desire 
through perfect possession of the supreme good. Thus VI e can 
bardly say that the natural desire is tor the su.preme good, 
and the tr~ory, therefore, otters no support to the eudaemono-
logioal argum.ent. ~"'or to prove that God does exist from nat ... 
ural desire, we must show that lie is the real object of that 
natural desire. And we see that the real objeot of Garrigou-
Lagrange t s natw:-al desire is not a direct possession of God 
but only an indirect possession. il'hus the theory does not 
offer perfect satisfaction to the appetite. aIld it offers no 
foundation for demonstrating tt~ existence of God from natural 
desire. Again, that desire of its nature terminates directly 
in f1nite pertections. Gra.."1ted, therefore, the existenoe ot 
t1nite perf'eotions. the tel'm of its natural desitte is possessed 
• 
And from fin8.~i ty alone how can it be proved that sotlothlng 
more than the tinite term must exist? The term of tlw appetite 
is reached, and that is an end of it as tar as l' l.na~l ty 1s con .... 
cerned. 
Finally, there is same question of the aocuracy of 
the statement that the intelleot has a natural desire to know 
God perfectly. fl'here is no doubt that the intellect does de-
sire to know God perfectly. But is this a natural desire in 
the primary sense of that term? Accottd1ng to an interpretation 
of st. Thomas by William R. OIConnott, the answer is in the neg-
ative. His interpretation is this. ~he primary natural desitte 
of the intellect is to know things perfectly. It will natu-
rally, therefore, seek to know the essence of allj"thing fulJ.y, 
and it will know the essence of a thing tully when it Itnows it 
in allot its causes. In describing th.is natural tendency of 
the intelleot. Fin!11 sayst 
The natural inclination or desire of the mind 1s tor 
knowledge; • • • 'l?his natural inclination will eVi-
dently extend to all kuOllledge that may pex-tect the 
mind, and this in man t 8 earthly condition is re-
strioted to the knowledge 01' the essences of material 
things. • • Perfect knowledge 01' any object oan only 
be said to be ours when we knOW' its ca.uses; henoe the 
natura.l desire at: the mind for knowledge is tor knowl-
edge ot essences and their causes. Moreover, knowl-
edge of the mere existence of a causa will not sat1s.fy 
this natural desire of the mind, for knowledge of the 
essence of that cause 1s also perfective of the mind 
and as sucb falls under the mind's natural desire. 
There would seem to be no end to this prooess, the 
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discovery of the existence of any cause onlY' sti..'I1IU-
lating further researoh to discover what it is in it-
self, and therefore what are it! causes. 18 
The proposition ~ intellectus natura+"i~.er desiderat divinae 
substantiae visionem clearl,. then is not 9. description ot the 
......... ~.. ...., ............................... 
initial state of the intellect. Primary is the desire to know 
perfectly I and .following on this is the perfect ton of lUlowing 
particular things totally .. 19 O'COnI10r bas this to say: 
Every power, every nature, has its natura.l ten-
dency, which is its natural desire. In the intellect 
1s a tendenoy flowing .fror,'I. its natural torm. as intel-
leot towards krlowledge and truth. tt All men by natt1.rO 
desire to know," said Aristotle, and st. Thomas gives 
us a special application of this general prinoiple in. 
his dootrine of a na~al desire tor the vision at God. 
Once we know that God exists, the intellect is still 
unsatisfied; it tends by its ve~y nature towards a 
further knowledge of Ilim. We know that God exists 
through the eelebrated five ways; does anyone imagine 
that the human mind 1s oompletely satlsfiedwhen it 
reaches the end of the five ways? The intellect can-
not be satisfied with partial truth or incomplete 
knowledge; 1t tends by a necessity of its nature to 
kI>.ow the essence ot: any objeot once it know this muoh 
about it .. that it exists. 20 
The natural desire of the intellect. therefore, is to k~ow 
things perfectly. Consequently, once it Itnows of the existence 
of God through t..llo five ways, then it desires to know Him 
19 ill,2., 335. 
20 William R.. O'Connor, The Natural Desl.:re Par God, 
Milwaukee, 1948, 33. _........ - -
71 
• 
perfectly. We note that the initial natural desire of the 
intellect is not for God. If, thareforel this interpretation 
of St. Thomas be oorrect, Garrigou-Lagrange's major is consid-
erably weakened. The primary movement of the intellect; on 
the psychologioal plane gives no indioation of hlw necessary 
existence of God. Moreover, the secondary movement toward 
God presupposes that his existence is knQwn bef'ore He is de-
sired naturally. The sixth way, the eudaemonological argu-
ment, finds little footing in this explanation of the nature 
of the natural desire of the intellect. 
Perhaps it is worth mentioning here that if the pro-
ponents of the eudaemonological argument could expeot to find 
support for their theory of natural desire, one would expect 
it to come from men like O'Connor and Finili. l{lor these men 
follow in general the doctrine of Sylvester of Ferrara, that 
mants desire for the beatific vision is elioited and natural. 
That position, if any, would seem favorable to the sixth way. 
Certa.inly, the position of Cajetan, that the desire is elio-
ited and supernatural, would seem less favorable. And the 
position ot Bannez, that the desire is conditional and inetfi. 
cacious, offers no help. 
A final quotation from O'Oonnor will conclude this 
particular point. 
It is important, however, to see that to desire 
r 
12 
• 
to know en object is not the same as desiriruj an 
objeot already known. The intellect naturally de ... 
sires to know rnore about God onoe it knows that He 
exists} but this does not mean that the will of' man 
naturally desires God as our beatitude bef'ore He 1s 
seen as He is in Himselt. 21 
Thus there is very little probability that we can argue from 
the natural desire ot the intellect to the necessary existence 
ot God. 
To oonclude our remarks on the theory of natural 
desire for a natural contemplation ot God, we will consider 
Garrigou-La.grange l s use of the term. universal good (ponum 
universale) as the formal object of the will. We have dis-
cussed the tb.ree possible interpretations of this term. It 
may seem universal good in the order ot being (J:!! ~ssendo) or 
God. in the order of predication (~praedleando), or in gen-
eral (!!! &~~!H-:!). In describing the object of the 'Will" 
• • • 11 a'en suit que Lfhomni.e. • • Garrigou-Lagrange says: t1 
ne peut trouver sa vrala b6atltude en aUCUD. bien tin! ou 
limit$; .. mals seulement dans 18 Souv.rain Bien (bonum un,1versale 
in esaendQ) .11 22 As it stands, that statement is true. True ____ III 
beatitude can be had only by direct possession of God. But 
the point at issue 1s not the tact of bead. tude but the natural 
desire ot the will. Is the natural tendency of the will to 
21 O'Connor, Natura~ ~tsire, 35. 
22 Garrlgou-Lagrange, I:!!. R'alism~.t 265 .. 
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universal good in tl~ order of being or to universal good in 
general? There seemB to be no disagreement that it is ordered 
to good in general. To use the formal object of the will, 
therefore, as if it were synonymous with the adequate object 
is to contuse the issue. And when Garrigou-Lagrange says f'irst 
that man can find his beatitude only in the Supreme Good and 
then uses that taot to demonstrate man's natural desire for 
God. he does use the adequate objeot of the w111 as if it were 
synonymous with the fo:rmal object of the will. This dist1ne-
tion is important. O'Mahony puts it rather clearly: 
The distinction between the finality of the 
intellectual nature as suoh and the realisation 
possible in virtue of its natural faculties i8 a 
metaphysical necessity. It arises out of the very 
antinomy of finite mind, whose "capacities" necea .... 
8&Jltily outstep its powers of real1zation. For 11' 
the finite mind, left to its natural faculties. 
oan attain God only in His f1nite manitestat1011B, 
the intellectual nature as such. bas a certain in-
finity in regard to its object. The object or in-
telligence and of w111 1s a certa1n potential in-
finite being. under its transcendental aspects of 
truth and goodness. Thus if the activities of' will 
and intellect cannot attain God direotly, but only 
in the .formal object or the tf good in generaltt and 
the "true in general," yet they reveal the funda-
mental Qrientation ot the nature whence they pro-
ceed. 2J 
It is extremely important to distinguish the primary tendency 
of the rational appetite, therei'ore, tz-om its secondary move-
23 James E. QtMahony, ~ Desire Q! ~, Dublin, 
1929, 253. 
r 
menta.. As with the will, so wl"t;h the intellect, its 1'01'"[,18.1 
object 1s being in general. Its natural secondary movements 
are propol"tioned to the sensible quiddity. The whole point 
of th.e adversaries of too eudaemonological argument is that 
the general concept ot being (!!l!.) must be determined before 
we know that it includes Supreme Being as tbe adequate object 
of the intellect. The determination of that con.eept, more-
over, cannot be done by the natural tendency of the :facuJ.ty 
toward being as such, but only by way of efficient causality. 
We know, in other worda, .finite creatUl"es as the proportioned 
objects of th$ intellect. On the principle of suf'fieient 
rea.son, we conclude ths existence of an infinite creator. Thus, 
tb.e general concept of being i$ further determined, and within 
the adequate object of the intellect lies infinite being. 
11'0 swrnnarize then, we have triad to show that 
Garrigou-Lagrangefs natural possession of the supreme good 
cannot afford the perfect satisfaction h$ demands. Further-
more, his natural possession of the supreme good cannot be 
used to demonstrate the absolute necessity of the existence 
ot God because its term is really the finite rather tl~l trw 
1nttnite. Again, his natural desire of the intelleot for God 
is a seoondary rather than a primary movement. And, finally, 
his use of the term Ulliversal soad is ambiguous. 
15 
Joseph Gredt uses the traditiona1 five ways to proV$ 
the ex.istence of God and adds a sixth way based on natural 
desire. This model of the sixth way is q,uite unlike that of 
Garrigou-Lagrange. The basic fact of the argument 1s the same 
as that found in other versions of it. In the human intellect 
and will there is a natural appetite tor beatitude whose spe-
cific object 1s infinite good. Granted this specitication of 
the appetite by the infinite good. that good must exist. No 
natural desire can be vain. It 1s the capacity of the intel .... 
leot and w111 that ~eveals the specification of the rational 
appetite. Gredt sa18: 
• • • This capacitl Is, however, objectively tnfinite, 
the intellect knows things under the aspect 01" being 
as such, and the lIill under the aspect of' uni v61'sal 
good. Wherefore the objective beatitude of man con-
sists Ul infinite good, which cannot be a created 
good. 24-
So we have the usual desire and the usual principle that such 
a desire cannot be frustrated. Gredtta oonclusion, however. 
has a peculiar twist. Granted, he says, the natural appetite 
foX' infinite good, that infinite good 113 possible. Since it 
.... 
24 Joseph Gredt, Q.5.B. J !!lemen1ta Ph11$>sophiae. 
Friburg~ 1937, II, 317. --••• Sed haec capacltaa est 
oblective intinlta: Intellectua retertur ad res sub ratione 
entia ut sic, at voluntas sub ratione boni universal1.. Quare 
beatitudo obi.cttva hom1nls consl.tit 10 bono infinito, quod 
non poteat esse aliquod bonum creatum. 
is infinite, being possible, it does exist. Gredt does not 
make the familiar transit from the desire to the fac-c of its 
object Umnediately beoause he holds that the existence of an 
object of natural desire need not be necessary and absolute, 
but only possible. In this instance ot it, however, because 
ot the lack of potentialIty in God, the tact that He is pos-
8ib1. makes His existence a necessity. Concerning this point 
be says: 
Granted the existence ot a specified object, thare 
is no universal and absolute necessity tor the ax-
istence of a specifying cause. But it is absolutely 
necessary that the specifying cause be at least pos-
sible. For if the specifying cause were impossible, 
the specified objeot would also be 1m:possibla. F'or 
U' the cause or specifying agent were absurd, the 
effect also or tbe specified object could be no other 
than absurd. Wheretore in our proposItion that nat ... 
ural appetite ident1fied \'lith the very nature of the 
will would be 1mpossible or absurd, and the will it-
selt would be impossible and absurd. 25 
And in this instance we know that infinite good must exist 
once we have granted its possibility because infinite good is 
25 I!?,!g., 200. --31 exist! t speoificatum, nOll 
sequitur quldem universallter et absolute. necessitate et1am 
eausam spec1ticantem exlstere. At absolute. necessitate 
sequitur specltleana saitem non esse impossibile. :Ram 81 
speclficana esset 1mpo8sib~le. etiam Ipecifloatum impossibiie 
esset. 31 8nlm causa seu obiectum dans specifioatlonem 
absurdum esset, etlam etractus seu spec1ticatum non posset 
non esse absurdum. Q,ufU'e in propoaito nostro appetltus il18 
natura11s identlticatu8 cum ipsa voluntatis natura esset 
impossIbi11a sau absurdus, 8t ipsa voluntas asset impossibilis 
et absurda.. 
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an absolutely necessary being, which is either impossible or 
actually does exist; there can be no potentiality in such Ii 
being. 
Gredt t s explanation of the intellect contrasts 
sharply with that 01' Garrigou-Lagrange and affords us the 
broadest possible interpretation of natural desire. Let us 
examine his theory to make this clear. The essentially spir-
itual quallt,. of tb& human cognitive facuJ.t'1. he says, em-
braces within the object 01' that fa.eulty all being, known not 
indirectly or analogically, but directly and positively. He 
says: 
• • • By that degree of tmmateriallty whien is 
found in spirituality strictly so ealJ.ed, the cog-
nitive power 1s established in sueh perfection that 
its formal object extends to all things, and 1ndaed 
to the attainment ot these things through a strictly 
qulddltative knowledge (that is, a positive knowl-
edge ot things as they are in themselves). 26 
However, Gredt continues, by reason of its present dependence 
on the material faculties, the intellect 2&r accidens, and by 
reason of the absence of the light of glory which strengthens 
and elevates 1t, is tor the time being excluded from a direct 
intuitive Vision ot God. Consequently, m.an has a positive 
26 Ibid .. , 432. '.. Immaterialitate, quae est 
spiritualltas s~rretedleta, eonstltuitur potentia 
eognose1tiva tantae perfectionist culus obiectum formale ad 
omnia e.xtendatur, it .. quldem ad omnia eognoseenda quiddlta ... 
tive cognitione qu1dditative stricte dicta (conceptu stricte 
qulddltatlvo seu simpliciter positivo.) 
ordination to the divine goodness whioh is passive and must 
be aetuallzed by the divine power. On this point Gredt says: 
The intelleot of its very nature ean know this object, 
whioh 1s the clear vision ot God, by &11 ordination 
not merely of non-repugnanee, but by a positive ordi-
nation. This is passive, however, and cannot be 
actualized other than by the divine power. 27 
Buckley desoribes the position in this way: 
Some authors think tbat the natural object ot 
the human intellect, the adequate object, perhaps, 
but atill natural to it, is being in all its ampli-
tude, in such a way that it includes positively not 
only all things but the ability to know them as they 
are in themselves. Aocording to th1s view, the faot 
that at present we know spiritual things only through 
and in the essemees of sensible objects or even that 
we know God through and in the mirror of creatures 
1s OWing solely to our present condition. Our pr-es-
ent condition ot union of soul and body, or even of 
non-elevation to grace, 1s looked upon as a limita-
tion plaeed on the human intellect's broader natural 
powers. 'lll1a view holds also that God known as lie 
18 1n Himself falls within the Roaitive natural 
scope of the human intellect. 26 
We might say at once that it 1s not our purpose to adjudicate 
the validity of the theory described above. What is apropos 
1s the possibility of proving the existence of God from the 
theory. Does the natural desire of the intellect, as Gredt 
27 Ibid., 433- Intelleotus natura sua ord1natur 
ad hoe obiectuii"O'Ognosoendum, quod est Deus olare visus, 
ordinatione; quae quldem non Gst mara non-repugnantia, sod 
ordlna.tl0 positiva. passiva tamen, neque aetuabilis nisi 
virtute d1v1na. 
2 B Buckley, ~an 's Last ~!!!:k 132. 
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d •• cribes it, support the eudaemonological argument? It would 
seem at fir st glance that this theory of dirac t vision of God 
as being within the natural powers of the intellect would sub-
stantiate ·the validity of the eudaemonologlcal argument. Let 
us examine the theory from this point of view. 
We note first of all tl~t the divine goodness, in 
Gredt t s theory, 11es within the adequate" object of the L"'J.tel-
leot and not within the scope of its propel' and proportioned 
object !!! ~ Rresent conditl!ln 2! ~ tacultl. }"i*or, as we 
have seen, the intellGot t s ordination to the clear vision of 
God must be actualized by the divine power. But the validity 
of the euda-emonological argument eannot be judged by the ordi-
nation at the intellect to its adequate object, but only by 
ita proportioned object. Why? Because it 1s precisely the 
content of the adequate object, i.e. the contentoi' the notion 
ot being as such, that must be determined. 'rhat the supreme 
be1ng 11es within the adequate object of the intelleot we do 
not know trom the initia.l ordination of tI.l$ 1ntelleot to i'&s 
proportionate object. We must argue tram the created effects 
that are the proport1oned objeots of the intellect to the 
neoessary existence ot a Oreatora. Once then the existence of 
the Creator is established, we kJ."lOW that he lies within the 
adequate objeot of the intelleot and subsequently we desire 
to know him perfectly. Gredtfa theory, theraetore, utilizing 
80 
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the adequate object of the intellect cannot be validly used 
to explain the eudaemonologioal argument. 
Secondly, in Gredt's natural intuition of God, a 
necessary oondition of th.a.t vision is a speoial elevation by 
God. Granted the existence ot God, this theory may explain 
a natural desire of the intellect tor Him. We note, however, 
that this theory presupposes the existence of God. Gredt's 
natural desire :tor God is, therefore, an ela.boration hardly 
conceivable as long as the proportioned object ot the intel-
lect 1s the sensible quiddity. To desire to know an object 
is not the same as desiring an object already known. We re-
oall again the important distinction between the metaphysioal 
and psychological orders. In the metaphysical order there 1s 
no difficulty about the tinal objeot of natural deslre. 
Granted that order, man with the rest of oreation is tending 
to God. In the psychological order, however, this is not the 
oase. The faoulty that entltatively must tend to God need 
not consciously tend to Him 1n its elioited aots. And the 
direotion of the latter will depend on the speoitioatlon of 
the faoulty. It that speoification 1s to universal good in 
the sense that whatever it does choose it will choose under 
the aspect of good, God is not the psychological objeot of 
its acts. Because the eudaemonological argument 1s on the 
81 
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psychological plane, we must conclude again that Gredt1s 
theory cannot be used validly to explain it. Thus on two 
main points, the use of the adequate rather than the propor-
tioned object and the presupposition of the existence of God, 
Gredt fails to support not, 1ndeed, his own theory of natural 
desire, but the eudaemonolog.ieal argu.ment. 
Turning now to the larger controversY' on natural 
desire, we will consider briefly the study Father Elter, S.J •• 
made of earlier scholastic teaohing on natural des~e. 29 
His conolusions will serve to empl14s1ze and support a basic 
point of the adVersaries of the eudaemonological argument. 
Father Elter came to "0 conolusions :from his analy-
sis of the history of natural desire. (1) Contrary to the 
most coumon doctrine of soholastics today, st. Tholnas and his 
contemporaries taught that in the natural order man oould 
attain only imperfect beatitude. (2) The key point in this 
doctrinal revolution--that man has a natural desire to be 
perfectlY' hapPY'--was the AHSYst1nu!, of Janseu, whioh. appeared 
in the year l~O. Jansents tb.esis was that man has a natural 
desire to be perfectly happy; but this true beatitude oan be 
found only in the beatific vision; therefore, man bas a 
.... 
29 E. Elter, S.J., "De natural! bominis 
beatitudine ad mentem .cholae antlqulorls." G,regorlanum, DC 
(1928), 269"'306. 
r..-----------. 
natural desire tor the beatifio vision. Not wishing to deny 
the first statement, that man has a natural desire for beati-
tude, scholastic authors denied the second, that true·beati-
tude can be fOUl'ld only in the beatific vision. 30 Father 
Eltel' says: 
\Y!Je think ••• that the major proposition in the argu-
ment of Jansen, which asserts that we have an innate 
desire for perfect beatitude, 1s not to be distin-
guished but simply to be d.(;tnied. Because the innate 
desire, or natural ordination, of the will concerns 
good in general, not tbe perfect good. the perfect 
good is, indeed, desired naturally; not, however, 
with an innate desire but with an elicited desire, 
as we have explained above. 31 
'llhis historical estimate of the problem, if correct, certainly 
weakens the eudaemono10gical argument. That man has no in-
nate desire tor perfect beatl'tude llleans that marl has no nat-
ural desire for God in the prim.ary sense ot the term.. Al'ld 
it we deny this natural desire, we torestall ~ly possibility 
of arogulng from th.e innate tendency of ths nature to the nec-
essary existence of God. In denying such a desire, moreover, 
the theorY' that man's contemplation in the natural order is 
for natural things 1s affirmed. And this too is contrary 
to the analysis of the object of man's desire by the proponent 
of the eudaemonologi(H"l argument. Finally, this theory 
30 
31 
Ibid., 284. 
-
Ibid., 2~ .• 
-
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upholds the two main contentions of the adversaries of that 
argument. The first is that there is no proportion between 
the finite faculty and the infinite object. The second, that 
the proportioned object ot the faculty does not directly in-
clude God. 
We have reViewed thus ta.r two examples of th.e eudae-
monological argmuent which offer the broadest possible inter-
pretations of it. Garrigou-Lagrange proposed a natural desire 
tor an indirect vision of God and beatitude; Gredt proposed 
a natural desire tor direct vision of God and beatitude. 
Neither offered safe tooting to the eudaemonological argument. 
We shall now consider brietly the study William R. O'Connor 
bas made of natural desire. Directly, he does not concern 
h~selt with the present argument, but several ot his conclu-
sions are pertinent in determining its validity. 
Does every creature--intellectual creature, that 
1s--have a natural desire tor the beatific Vision? According 
to O'Connor, st. Thomas's answer 1s a straightforward tlNo.t1 
Prior to all actual knowledge, is the intellect tending by its 
nature towards this vision as the only object that can finally 
put an end to its unlimited craving tor truth? Again, tlNo. n32 
And. this, in spIte at the fact, says a-Connor, that the only 
32 0' Connor t Natural Des ire, 21. 
r 
historical end man has ever had is that of the vision of God. 
The basic factor in the doctrine of st. Thomas, 
according to O'Oonnor, when Thomas is speaking of natural de-
sire 1s the primacy of intellect over will. This primacy ex-
tends even to the innate, natural tendency of the w111. The 
will 1s the eppetlte of the soul which follows an apprehended 
good. The natural object of the will is happiness, but that 
happiness is not independent of cognition. Because man can-
not see God directly in his natural state, and therefore be-
cause the intellect never identities the direct vision of God 
with the oomplete good as far as natwal desire is concerned, 
the will cannot have a natural desire tor the vision of God. 
Tha heart of the matter is the primacy of the intellect and 
its manner of knowing God. Since the will f'o.llows the intel-
lect and since the intellect has no natural knowledge of God, 
the will can have no natwal desire tor the beatific vision. 33 
It is the emphasis that O'Connor places on the doc-
trine of' Thomas concerning the natural object of the intellect, 
and therefore of the will, that is of importance in deciding 
the validity ot the eudaemonological argument. CleQ.l"ly, in 
this interpretation of the natural objeot ot the faoulties, 
33 Ibid., 28. 
-
rr--------. 
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the possibility of knowing the existence of God from the pro-
portioned object of the intellect 1s impossible. What 1s more 
decisive is the further development of natural desire by 
O'Oannol". This point we have discussed above. Doea st. Thomas 
teach a genuine natural desire for God? Yes, he does. Is tb.a.t 
desire a natural desire in the sense of a primary movement of 
the rational appetite~ .tiO, it isn.t. That desire must be 
understood in the light of the relation between the L'1tellect 
and knowledge. After we know that God exists through the 
agency of the five ways, then the natural dosire of the intel-
lect to know a thing in all of its causes, to know more a:.nd 
more abou.t it until its knowability is exhausted, camoa into 
play. The intelleot, therefore. knowing that He exists desires 
to know ~ this 1s that exists. For our present purpose it 
is s·utfioient to point out that this natural desire is conse-
quent to the knowledge of the existence of God.. 34 O'Oonnor 
pute it this way: 
It is important, however, to see that to desire 
to know an object 1$ not the s_a as desiring an objec t 
already known. The intellect naturally desires to know 
more about God onee it knows that He exists; but this 
d08S not mean that the will of man naturally desires 
God as our beatitude before He is seen as He is in 
Ibid., )). 
-
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Himself. • • • Even in a state of pure nature, 
where tho vision ot God would not have been granted 
as the end ot man, the natural desire to see Him 
would still be present atte~ His existence came to 
be known by reason alone. 3.? 
There 1s no question hare ot progressing from an innate desire 
to the existence ot 1ts term. Rather, tram the existence ot 
the term., the desire Is awakened to know not only that the 
particular objeot 1s but what it is. When O'Oonnor refers 
to reason as the method ot determining the existence ot God, 
be 1s reterring to the five ways. This process, we have 
described above; from the proportioned object ot the intellect, 
created being, we reason to a O~ator. Thus we deteJ:>Y.lline the 
content--or a particular part of the oontent of the adequate 
object ot the intellect, placing within it the real existeme 
ot Supreme Being. 
Why is 1t impossible tor the divine substance to be 
the natural end ot any created intelligence? O'Oonnor's 
answer is based on his concept of being.. The simple subsist-
ing ot the Oreator is on one level; the oompound being of' tho 
oreature 1s on another. The lattarts mode or ootivity follows 
its mode ot being. Theretore, no natural direot knowledge of 
a being on the higher level is possible. Man's natural 
35 Ibid., 35. 
-
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knowledge of God must be indirect, analogical: 
Ii10r st. Thomas Aquinas no created intellect 
tends by 1ts nature towards a direct and immediate 
vision of God as i t8 natural end. '2he analogy ot 
being makes this impossible. Knowledge always takes 
place accordlngto the way in which the knowing sub-
ject &%.i8t8. Where the mode of being of an object 
al together transcends the mode of being of the knower, 
a direct knowledge of the essence ot such an object 
1s above the natu:re ot the knower. God t S mode ot 
being ls, as 1t were, to be subslst1..."lg being; avery 
creature, spiritual or material, is. not $Ubsistlng 
bel1~ but a OOlnpound of essence and existence. This 
tact alone makes it impossible for the divine sub-
stance tg be the natural end of any created intelli-
gence • .3 
In this theory the lack of proportion between the finite 
faculty and the infinite term is tully substantiated. That, 
of course, 1s one of the major contentions of the adversarios 
of the eudaemonological argument. 
To oonclude this ehapter, we shall attempt to sum-
marize the main points that have been made. This will be done 
in a series of questions. which will touch. on the kay issues 
under discussion. 
Has man a natural desire for the beatific vision? 
The answer to thi$ question does not admit of a siutple answer. 
As it touebllul the present argum.ent only indireotly, we offer 
one interpretation of 1t and pass 1:i:n.'11ediately to a more 
pertinent facet of the same problem. Regarding this first 
36 Ibid •• 37. 
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question, however, Father De Broglie, S.J., says this: 
It is an article of faith that the vision of 
God in store for man exceeds the powers ot human 
nature,-.and. it is at least theologically oertain 
that be has no exigency tor It;.-lt 1s certain too 
that that vision 1s properly supernatural both for 
man and for any created spirit. • • • 
It is theologically certain, therefore, that 
the tact of man's vocation to the divine vision can-
not be demonstrated. with certainty by philosophy. 37 
We quote this passage simply to point out that manf s natural 
desire for God 1s not foX' the bea.tific vision. Could the 
contrary be proved, there would be no question of the validity 
of the eudaemonological argument. But a defender of the argu-
ment need not hold that man has a natural desire for the 
beatifio vision. What he must hold is a natural desire for 
god. But possession of God may tall short of the beatific 
Vision. Thus Garrlgou-Lagrange, a.s we have seen. 
Does man have an aptitude tor the beatlfic vision? 
Thi .• question concerns the capacity 01.' man for the beatific 
viSion. Granted that it is a 8upernatUlla.l gitt, not required. 
37 Vitus De Brogli., S.J., De Fine Ulti!0 I~anae 
Iitae, PaX'is, 1948, Pars Prior, 163 andl~ Ad ~dem pertInet 
quod visia Dei hominibus praep&ra.ta excedit bumanae naturae 
vil"es, ........ et salt em theologice certum est quod excedit eius 
exlgentla.s,--1mmo quod 111& vls10 proprie supernaturalis eat, 
tum in homine,--tum etiam in spirltu quolibet ereato. • • • 
lIine theolog1ce certum est factum vocationls hominum 
ad dlvinam v1sionem non pos$e per phi1osophiam. carto demon-
s~rarl. 
p 
by nature, oan man's capacity tor it be demonstrated philosoph-
lcally? De Broglie says: 
It 1s easily seen that one might grant the 
philosopher the mere power of demonstrating that 
man could be raised to that vision (God willing), 
without thereby conceding him the right or power 
ot affirming the exigency of that vision. And only 
the latter, properly- spea.king, would ga.insay the 
supernatural or gratuitous note of the vision. 38 
The supernatural aspect of the vision in no way 
excludes the opinion that msn's aptitude tor it can 
be established with philosophic cert~inty, nor does 
it deserve any theological censure. 39 
Thus, as tax- as the theologian is ooncerned, there is no 000-
tradiction in a philosophic demonstration of man- s capacity 
for the beatifie vision. What we are interested in .. however, 
is whether this possibility helps the eudaemonologioal argu ... 
m.nt. Obviously it does not. The valIdityof' tbat argument 
is based on the absolute necesslty of areal term tor the 
rational appetite. It Is only possible to prove the existence 
ot God tram natural desire when betwe~n the appetite and Its 
--_._--_.-
)8 Ibid ... 192. Sed, ut facile vides, s1 quia 
attribuit philosophlae meram potestatem demonstrandl quod homo 
Rossit (sl Deo p1acuer1t) ad 111am v1s!onet;1 evehi, is non 1deo 
Illttribult philosophiae jus aut potestatem eU'.flrm.andl exigentiam 
ll1ius vlsionis,--quod solum proprle eontradiceret BUpernat-
ul'alltati seu gratultatl 1psius. 
39 Ibid., 189. Opinio vera secundum quam ipsa. 
phl1osophia ce~demonstrare poteat aptltud1nem nominis ad 
talem vQoationem neque per supernaturalitatem dlvinae visionls 
excluditur,--Neque ullam censuram theologicam merer! videtur. 
-----------_ ..... 
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object there is an absolutely Il$cessary relation. But the 
tact that nUUl has an aptitude for the beatific vision which 
possibly can be demonstrated philosophically shows not a nec-
essary relation but mere capacity. From mere capacity one 
cannot demonstrate the existence of God. 
Does man have a natural desire for God oolO\Y the 
supernatural. plane that might be used to demonstrate Ilis exist-
ence? ~Ne $l"e not concerned now with the beatific vision. On 
the purel,. natural plane man can be said to desire God in two 
ways. The fil'st concems the m.etaphysical order. Granted the 
relation that 1s established at creation between creature and 
Creator. there 1s no dispute that every created good is a par-
'lcipation of the infinite good of the creator.. In every act 
ot appetition, therefore, in seeking created good, necessaril.y, 
11' implicitly, we do seek and tend toward the increated Good" 
This is certainly a natural desire for God in the metaphysical 
order. Secondly, in the psychological order there is a. nat ... 
ural desire for God that 1s basad on the nature of the intel-
lect. Once the intellect knows that So thing exists, it nat-
ura.lly desires to exhaust the knowability of that objeot. It 
oannot be satisfied with ineanlplete knowledge. Having known 
of tne existence ot God, therefore, it necessarily tends to 
know more a.nd more about lU.,,'n.. This is what we mean by natural 
?l 
desire for God on the psychological plane. And this is ex-
plained at length earlier in this chapter. 
We have. therefore, tW'o types of natural desire tor 
God, and the question is whether either ot tham is sufficient 
to establish the validity ot the eudaemonologioal argument. 
The natural desire on the ontological plane, i.e. that we 
necessarily seek God impliCitly in every act of appetition, 
does not balp the argument. To know of this implicit desire 
for God, we must first know that God exists. In other words, 
the ontological order must first be established. Yet it is 
precisely th.e foroe of the euda.emonologioal argu.ment that it 
presupposes no such. order. The natural desire on the psycho-
logical plana oan not support the argument either. Aga.in, 
before that desire is conceived, the existence of God must be 
known. Only consequent to the taet ~ God is does the in<~el .. 
lect seek to know !!!!! He is--to know Him perfeotly in all 
aspects. 
Can the rational appe'tite orman be perf"ectlysa.t-
iafled short of the beatific vision'l Th.ere 1s only one answer 
to this question, no. It 1s tbe very nature of the rational 
appetite that being capable ot possessing God in his f'ulness, 
b7 reason of thAll universality of its formal object, nothing 
short of full possession of Htm will perfectly satisfy the 
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